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sional efforts to strip federal courts of jurisdiction in controversial
areas-abortion, flag burninag, or what have you-thereby leaving the
last word to state judges who lack article III insulation from political
pressure? From the First Judiciary Act on, this question has periodically occupied center stage in the high drama of national politics. To
be sure, the substantive targets of would-be jurisdiction strippers in
Congress have varied, from the attempts ofJohn C. Calhoun and his
followers in the early nineteenth century to eliminate all Supreme
Court federal question review of state courts,' to the more selective
efforts of politicians in the latter half of this century to oust federal
court review of school segregation and school prayer.2 But in spite
of the substantive differences in the targets of attack, the basic separation of powers issue has remained the same: how much power to
restrict federal jurisdiction does the Constitution give Congress?
For the moment, at least, the debate over this question appears
to have moved from Congress and the courts into the academy. But
we should not let the relative silence of the political branches these
days obscure the stakes involved. While jurisdiction stripping seems
for the moment to have dropped off the immediate congressional
agenda, it could at any moment get put back on (perhaps in response
to a particularly controversial Supreme Court opinion) as should be
evident from my opening reference to abortion and flag burning.
What's more, we must remember that "ordinary" adjudication, even
during "quiet" periods, takes place in the shadow of whatever jurisdiction stripping powers Congress lawfully possesses, whether or not
these powers are ever exercised. The President, for example, need
not exercise his veto power to make his views felt in the House and
Senate; the mere fact that such power lawfully exists enables him to
credibly (and perhaps quietly) threaten to veto undesirable bills"Go ahead, make my day! "--and thereby discourage Congress from
ever passing such bills.' So too, if the political branches do indeed
enjoy virtually plenary jurisdiction-stripping power, as some have
claimed, savvy federal judges will keep this power in mind whenever
they decide controversial cases. Finally, the issues implicated by the
1 See generally G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 36-39 (11 th ed. 1985); Warren,
Legislative and JudicialAttacks on the Supreme Court of the United States-A History of the
Twenty-Fifth Section of theJudiciary Act, 47 AM. L. REV. 1, 161 (1913).
2 See, eg., G. GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 48 (discussing recent bills); Baucus & Kay,
The Court StrippingBills: Their Impact on the Constitution, the Courts, and Congress, 27 VILL.
L. REV. 988, 992 n.18 (1982) (same).
3 The framers well understood this political science law of anticipated response.
See Amar, PhiladelphiaRevisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1043, 1083-84 & nn. 142-47 (1988).
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jurisdiction stripping debate go to the very heart of the role of federal courts in our constitutional order. The view of federalism and
separation of powers one articulates in the context of the jurisdiction
stripping debate is likely to have important implications for many
other key debates in the field of federal jurisdiction-over the appropriate scope of various abstention doctrines, the preclusive effect of
state court determinations in federal court, the proper scope of federal habeas corpus review, and the meaning of the eleventh amendment, to name just a few. 4
The first major Supreme Court pronouncement on the issue of
jurisdiction stripping came in Justice Joseph Story's landmark opinion for the Court in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee.5

Story's analysis,

though not without flaws, deserves especially close attention because
it remains to this day the most comprehensive discussion of the issue
in the pages of U.S. Reports. In one key passage that, until very
recently, was all but ignored by most twentieth century commentators, Story noted that the words of article III appear to distinguish
between two fundamentally different tiers, or "classes," of jurisdictional categories:
The first class includes cases arising under the constitution, laws,
and treaties of the United States; cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, and cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. In this class, the expression is, and [sic] that the
judicial power shall extend to all cases; but in the subsequent part of
the clause which embraces all the other cases of national cognizance, and forms the second class, the word "all" is dropped seemingly ex industria. Here the judicial authority is to extend to
controversies (not to6 all controversies) to which the United States
shall be a party, &c.
Story immediately followed this textual observation with a reminder
that the specific and selective language of article III should not be
lightly presumed unintentional or meaningless: "From this difference of phraseology, perhaps, a difference of constitutional intention
may, with propriety, be inferred. It is hardly to be presumed that the
variation in the language could have been accidental.
It must have
7
been the result of some determinate reason."
4 See, eg., Fallon, The Ideologies of FederalCourts Law, 74 VA. L. REv. 1141, 1145-46
(1988) (noting diversity of constitutional, statutory, and federal common law issues
implicated by judicial federalism).
5 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
6 Id. at 334.
7 Id
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But what precise meaning should be attributed to the two-tiered
language of article III? For Story, an easy answer presented itself:
[I]t is not very difficult to find a reason sufficient to support the
apparent change of intention. In respect to the first class, it may
well have been the intention of the framers of the constitution
imperatively to extend the judicial power either in an original or
appellate form to all cases; and in the latter class to leave it to congress to qualify the jurisdiction, original or appellate, in such man8
ner as public policy might dictate.
Story's easy answer retied on more than wooden textualism,
glossed by the classic rule of construction that no word in the Constitution should casually be dismissed as surplusage. In the ensuing
paragraphs, Story went on to suggest that his proposed two-tiered
reading drew support from major structural differences between the
two classes of jurisdiction:
The vital importance of all the cases enumerated in the first
class to the national sovereignty, might warrant such a distinction
....
All these cases, then, enter into the national policy, affect the
national rights, and may compromit the national sovereignty. The
original or appellate jurisdiction ought not, therefore, to be
restrained, but should be commensurate with the mischiefs
intended to be remedied, and, of course, should extend to all cases
whatsoever.
A different policy might well be adopted in reference to the
second class of cases; . . . they might well be left to be exercised
under the exceptions and regulations which congress might, in
their wisdom, choose to apply. It is also worthy of remark, that
congress seem, in a good degree, in the establishment of the present judicial system, to have adopted this distinction. In the first
class of cases, the jurisdiction is not limited except by the subject
matter; in the second, it is made materially to depend upon the
9
value in controversy.
Id.
9 Id. at 334-36. Story's argument in Martin is not wholly free from ambiguity.
See Amar, A Neo-FederalistView ofArticle III: Separatingthe Two Tiers of FederalJurisdiction,
65 B.U.L. REV. 205, 211 (1985) [hereinafter Amar, A Neo-Federalist View] (Story's
"exposition has generated considerable confusion"); Amar, Law Story (Book Review),
102 HARv. L. REV. 688, 710 (1989) (Story's two-tier language is "in some tension
with other things that Story said"). Elsewhere in Martin, Story seems to lump
together all nine categories of "cases" and "controversies," stating:
If then, it is a duty of congress to vest the judicial power of the United
States, it is a duty to vest the whole judicial power. The language, if
imperative as to one part, is imperative as to all.... [F]or the constitution
8
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In 1985 I sought to revive and elaborate the central insights of
has not singled out any class on which congress are bound to act in
preference to others.
14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 330; see also id. at 336 ("We do not, however, profess to place
any implicit reliance upon the distinction which has here been stated and endeavored
to be illustrated."). These passages imply that Congress must vest all nine categories
of "cases" and "controversies" in the federal courts, at least on appeal. The tension
between Story's broad mandatory thesis (all nine categories must be vested, at least
on appeal) and his narrower one (only the first three categories must be so vested)
resurfaces in Story's subsequent writings, in which he hesitates to let go complbtely
of the broader argument, yet places much more weight on the narrower two-tier thesis: "[I]t is clear, from the language of the constitution, that, in one form or the other
[i.e., original or appellate], it is absolutely obligatory upon congress, to vest all the
jurisdiction in the national courts, in that class of cases at least, where it has declared,
that it shall extend to 'all cases.'" 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTrruTION
OF THE UNITED STATES § 1696 (1833). Note how the words "at least" mediate this
tension. In yet another passage of Martin, Story, in passing, seems to refer approvingly to yet another (and broader still) mandatory argument, requiring that all nine
categories be vested in the federal courts' originaljurisdiction: "But there is, certainly, vast weight in the argument which has been urged, that the constitution is
imperative upon congress to vest all the judicial power of the United States, in the
shape of original jurisdiction, in the supreme and inferior courts created under its
own authority." 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) at 336; cf. G. GUNTHER, supra note 1, at 49 (noting
that some have read Martin as standing for this broadest proposition). The various
passages in Martin cited in this note are best understood as part of Story's overall
argumentative strategy of presenting a series of overlapping and concentric arguments in the alternative about the precise contours of the mandatory nature of federal jurisdiction. Cf. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 336 ("At all events, whether the one
construction or the other prevail ..... "); id. at 339-42 (suspending, arguendo, the
claim that lower federal courts are mandatory, yet retaining the argument that federal
judicial power, via Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over state courts, must
extend to all cases in certain categories). I have chosen to single out the particular
passage from Martin quoted in the text because, for reasons that I shall summarize
below, this is the argument in Martin that I find most persuasive-indeed, compelling.
Consistent with the general principle of interpretive charity, see R. DWORKIN, LAW'S
EMPIRE 44-53 (1986), this is the argument that should be understood as Story's central claim; consistent with the requirement of scholarly rigor, this is the argument that
all modem scholars of federal jurisdiction and constitutional law must engage upon
pain of slaying straw.
In informal conversations, it has been suggested to me that the Martin passage
quoted in the text may not be concerned with the limits of congressional power to
strip jurisdiction from federal courts and give the last word to state courts, but
instead with the somewhat different question of which categories of federal jurisdiction must be vested exclusively in federal courts, as courts of originaljurisdiction. Not
only does this reading offend the principle of interpretive charity in rendering the
passage less rather than more persuasive, it simply makes hash of the passage's
words. First, the two-tier language quoted in the text speaks over and over of original or appellatejurisdiction. Second, Story specifically invokes congressional power to
make "exceptions and regulations"--language that applies only to appellate jurisdiction. Third, the passage concludes by noting that the two-tier thesis is consistent
with-and indeed, derives additional plausibility from-the Judiciary Act of 1789.
Yet this Act conferred no general federal question original jurisdiction-much less
exclusive federal question original jurisdiction-on lower federal courts but rather left
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Martin, even as I rejected less plausible passages of the opinion, such
as Story's claim that lower federal courts were constitutionally
required."0 I summarized my position as follows:
First, Article III vests the j adicial power of the United States in the
federal judiciary, and not in state courts, or in Congress. Second,
the federal judiciary must include one Supreme Court; other Article III courts may-but need not-be created by Congress. Third,
the judicial power of the United States must, as an absolute minirpum, comprehend the subject matter jurisdiction to decide finally
all cases involving federal -questions, admiralty, or public ambassadors. Fourth, the judicial power may-but need not-extend to
cases in the six other, party-defined, jurisdictional categories. The
power to decide which of these party-defined cases shall be heard
in Article III courts is given to Congress by virtue of its powers to
create and regulate the jurisdiction of lower federal courts, to make
exceptions to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, and to
enact all laws necessary and proper for putting the judicial power
into effect. Fifth, Congress's exceptions power also includes the
power to shift final resolution of any cases within the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction to any other Article III court that
Congress may create. The corollary of the power is that if Congress chooses to make exceptions to the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction in admiralty or federal question cases, it must create an
inferior federal court with jurisdiction to hear such excepted cases
at trial or on appeal; to do otherwise would be to violate the commands that the judicial power "shall be vested" in the federaljudithe Supreme Court with general federal question jurisdiction on appeal, under § 25.
Thus, the passage's two-tier thesis is obviously concerned with federal judicial power
as a whole, and not simply with original jurisdiction, exclusive or concurrent. Furthermore, Story later explicitly argues that in some federal question cases, state
courts must exercise original-indeed exclusive-jurisdiction.See 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at
342. Finally, Story's later two-tier language in his Commentaries, quoted above, is
wholly separate from any discussion of the distinct question of exclusive jurisdiction.
Thus, the two-tier language quoted in the text is about "exclusive" jurisdiction only
in the sense that it asserts that state courts must be excluded from pronouncing the last
(as opposed to the first) word on all cases in the first tier. One page later in Martin,
however, Story does finally opine on the narrow question of exclusive original jurisdiction. See id. at 336-37 (federal criminal prosecution is "unavoidably ... exclusive
of all state authority," including state court original jurisdiction); see also 3 J. STORY,
supra, §§ 1742-52; Amar, A Neo-Federalist View, supra, at 212-13.
10 Amar, A Neo-Federalist View, supra note 9, at 210-14. In the second edition of
his casebook on federal courts, Professor Martin Redish implies that I argued that
lower federal courts are required. See M. REDISH, FEDERAL COURTS 179, 184-85 (2d
ed. 1988). Professor Redish is mistaken (or at least misleading). Time and again, my
1985 essay invoked the Madisonian Compromise and emphatically argued that no
lower federal courts are constitutionally required. See Amar, A Neo-Federalist View,
supra note 9, at 206, 212-14, 216-1.8, 229 & n.84, 233-34, 246, 255, 268 n.213, 272.
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"shall extend to all" federal question and admiralty
ciary, 1 and
1
cases.

In their recently released third edition of Hart & Wechsler's The
Federal Courts and the FederalSystem, the editors begin their notes on
congressional power to limit federal court jurisdiction with a newly
captioned section entitled, "The Position ofJustice Story." In sharp
contrast to earlier editions, which neither quoted nor even mentioned Story's two-tier thesis,"2 the third edition introduces the
reader to key portions of the above-quoted passage in Martin.'" A
few pages later, the editors describe and analyze my 1985 effort to
resurrect this prong of Martin. They graciously describe my argument as "full[,]" "forceful[," and "powerful[]" but note that
it raises difficult questions of its own. If the distinction between the
two tiers was so significant, why is there so little evidence of explicit
recognition of that distinction in contemporary commentary or in
the available history of the 1789 (judiciary] Act? Why did the Act
in federal court jurisdiction, even in the
leave some significant gaps
14
"mandatory" categories?

These important questions deserve serious answers, and no time
seems better than the present-while we are still in the shadow of the
Bicentennial of the First Judiciary Act-to re-examine the Act's text,
structure, and legislative history to see what light they cast upon the
two-tier thesis. In the analysis that follows, I shall take up Hart &
Wechsler's questions in reverse order-first, in Section I, by examining the words and logic of the Act itself, and then, in Section II, by
sifting the Act's rather sparse legislative history.' 5
11 Amar, A Neo-Federalist View, supra note 9, at 229-30.
12 Elsewhere, I have harshly criticized this omission. See Amar, Law Story, supra
note 9, at 709-10.
13 See P. BATOR, D. MELTZER, P. MISHKIN & D. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER'S
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYsTEM 366-68 (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter
HART & WECHSLER].

14 Id. at 386 (footnotes omitted).

15 The editors of the third edition pose three additional questions:
Why did the drafters of Article III single out cases affecting ambassadors,
etc., for mandatory treatment and leave Congress an option in cases in
which the United States was a party? And what are the present-day
implications of the thesis for the broad scope of the Supreme Court's
discretion to deny certiorari? Or for the authority of Congress to delegate
certain matters to the final decision of a non-Article III federal tribunal?
Id at 386-87 (footnote omitted). For a response to the first of these questions, see
infra notes 76-80 and accompanying text; see also 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 334-36; Amar,
A Neo-Federalist View, supra note 9, at 253-54. For a response to the second question,
see id. at 267-69. For a response to the third question, see Amar, Marbury, Section 13,
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THE LANGUAGE AND STRUCTURE OF THE FIRST JUDICIARY

A.

ACT

The Two-Tier Thesis Revisited

Before we turn directly to the Act, it may be helpful to categorize and summarize the basic lines of argument underlying my 1985
essay, so that we can more carefully measure the Act against these
principles.
1.

The Holistic Principle'

6

The holistic principle insists first, that we must look at the judicial power of the United States as a whole. Thus, we must examine
how the jurisdiction of all federal courts-supreme and inferior, in
both original appellate modes-fits together. Second, holism insists
that we see how the words--all the words-of article III mesh into a
coherent whole.' 7 These two holistic inquiries are obviously interrelated, for it is the text itself (as a whole) that focuses attention on the
"judicial power of the United States" which "shall be vested" in federal "judges" holding office during "good behaviour" and "shall
extend to all cases" in certain categories, in either "original" or

"appellate" form.

The antithesis of holism is a selective literalism that sees "the
issues of lower federal court jurisdiction, Supreme Court appellate
jurisdiction, and the import of the salary and tenure requirements
...as distinct inquiries."'" Under selective literalism's divide-andand the OriginalJurisdictionof the Supreme Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 443, 451 n.43 (1989)
[hereinafter Amar, Section 13]; see also Fallon, Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 HAgv.L. REv. 916, 939-40 & nn.150-52 (1988).
16 See generally Amar, A Neo-Fderalist View, supra note 9, at 211-59.
17 This holistic search for textual coherence is related to holism on yet a third
level-what might be called "interpretive holism." See generally R. DWORKIN, supra
note 9, at 225-75 (discussing "integrity"); Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/
Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 515-47 (1989) (discussing "synthesis"); Amar,
Section 13, supra note 15, (illustrating interpretive holism); Fallon, A Constructivist
Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189 (1987)
(discussing "coherence").
18 Redish, Constitutional Limitations on Congressional Power to Control Federal
Jurisdiction:A Reaction to Professor Sager, 77 Nw. U.L. REV. 143, 144 (1982). Professor
Redish's own scholarship is emblematic of this "divide and conquer" approach to
constitutional interpretation. As we shall see, this narrow clause-bound textualism
fails even on its own terms, for it fails to provide a satisfactory account of other words
of article III ("shall," "all"); moreover, it does violence to a number of integrated
structural postulates at the heart of that article. See infra text accompanying notes 1936. For two recent expositions of article III that successfully resist the allure of the
divide and conquer approach, see Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court
Jurisdiction: A Guided Questfor the Original Understandingof Article II, 132 U. PA. L. REV.
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conquer (il)logic, the permissive (Congress-empowering) language
of the inferior courts clause ("such inferior courts as the Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish") and the exceptions
clause ("with such exceptions and... regulations as the Congress
shall make") are jointly deployed to outflank the clear language of
the mandatory "shall be vested" and "shall extend" provisions and
thereby undermine the spirit of article III's salary and tenure
protections.
2.

19
The Bifurcation Principle

In contrast to selective literalism, the holistic principle insists
that even though Congress has sweeping power to restrict the jurisdiction of lower federal courts and broad authority to make exceptions to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, it does not
necessarily follow that Congress can exercise both powers at once so
as to eliminate a given case from the federal judicial power and
thereby give state courts the last word. Rather, the answer will
depend not simply on the permissive language of the exceptions and
inferior courts clauses but also on the language of other clauses of
article III. Once those clauses are consulted, it becomes clear that in
some jurisdictional categories, the Constitution requires that the
judicial power (which "shall be vested" in federal courts) "shall
extend to all cases"; thus, Congress cannot exercise its powers simultaneously. In other categories-namely, those denominated "controversies"-the judicial power need not extend to "all" lawsuits;
here, Congress is free to combine its powers over supreme and inferior federal courts. Thus, holism leads us to the principle that article
III is bifurcated into two fundamentally different tiers.
Holism is related to bifurcation on yet another level. Not only
does holism insist that we pay attention to the mandatory language
("shall," "all") as well as the permissive clauses of article III; holism
also helps us to interpret the "mandatory" language itself. Bifurcation is rooted not simply in the plain-meaning argument that "shall"
means "shall" and "all" means "all," but also in the holistic principle
that other words of article III confirm the meanings of "shall" and
"all." The very contrast between, on the one hand, the "shall be
vested" and "shall extend" phrasing and, on the other hand, the
741 (1984); Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term-Foreword: ConstitutionalLimitations on
Congress' Authority to Regulate theJurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARv. L. REv. 17
(1981).
19 See generally Amar, A Neo-Federalist View; supra note 9, at 240-59.
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obviously permissive language that Congress "may" create lower
federal courts, underscore, the former clauses' mandatory character-as does comparison with other uses of the word "shall" in article III and in the "shall be vested" language of articles I and II. So
too, it is the very fact that "all" is used selectively-repeated three
times, and then omitted six times in article III's jurisdictional menu,
and then used with great care in article III's next paragraph-that
helps corroborate its significance. Only the bifurcation principle can
give a holistic account of the selective use and nonuse of "all." In
contrast, unitary (nonbifurcated) readings of article III assert either
that virtually all federaljurisdiction is permissive, thus trivializing the
inclusion of "all" in the first tier, 20 or that virtually all federal jurisdiction is mandatory,2 " thus glossing over the absence of "all" in the
second tier.
Although textual evidence provides the most obvious and tangible argument for the bifurcation principle, the deepest and most satisfying reasons for embracing bifurcation are structural. Simply put,
the need for mandatory federal jurisdiction in first tier categories,
especially in the two categories subject to the exceptions clausefederal question and admiralty cases-is far more compelling than in
second tier categories, such. as diversity. Indeed, to the extent that
some commentators have viewed certain second tier categories, such
as U.S. party suits, as specially important,2 2 I submit it is precisely
because lawsuits in these categories are likely to raise federal questions and thereby implicate "arising under" jurisdiction. And it is
precisely because diversity jurisdiction cases implicate true federal
questions with far less regularity that most serious students of federal jurisdiction-from the 1780s 2 3 to the 1980s 2 4 -- have viewed
diversity as the least essential category of federal jurisdiction.
20 See, e.g., M. REDISH, supra note 10, at 184-85; Redish, Congressional Power to
Regulate Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction Under the Exceptions Clause: An Internal and
External Examination, 27 VILL. L. REV. 900 (1982) [hereinafter Redish, Congressional
Power]; Redish, supra note 18, at 1,44-54.
21 See, e.g., 1 W. CROSSKEY, Pc.Lrrics AND THE CONSTrrTUION IN THIE HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES 610-20 (1953); Clinton, supra note 18, at 749-54. Some parts of

Story's opinion in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee seem to lean in this direction. See supra
note 9.
22 See, e.g., HART & WECHSLER, supra note 13, at 386-87; cf infra notes 76-80 and

accompanying text.
23 See Amar, A Neo-Federalist View, supra note 9, at 245-54; Friendly, The Historic
Basis of DiversityJurisdiction,41 HARV. L. REv. 483 (1928); Lettersfrom the FederalFarmer,
in THE ANTIFEDERALISTS 197, 230 (C. Kenyon ed. 1985); Warren, New Light on the

History of the FederalJudiciaryAct of1789, 37 HARv.L. REv. 49, 81-82 (1923); infra note
62.
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3.

25
The Structural Superiority Principle

The principle of the federal judiciary's structural superiority
complements bifurcation; whereas the bifurcation idea reminds us
that the first tier is quite different from the second, the structural
superiority principle emphasizes that federal and state judges are
quite different. Unlike state judges, all article III judges, supreme
and inferior, are officers of the nation. All federal judges are
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, paid from
the national treasury, guaranteed an undiminishable salary and tenure during good behavior, and made accountable to the nation
through the national impeachment process. Through these structural provisions the federal Constitution assures the competence,
impartiality, and probity of federal judges in ways that no state constitution must (or even can) for state judges. As we shall see below,
the structural superiority thesis has special significance when considered in connection with bifurcation, emphasizing the particular
importance-indeed the indispensability-of article III salary and
tenure guarantees in all cases arising under federal law, whether in
law, equity, or admiralty.26
The principle of structural superiority stands opposed to "the
myth of parity" 2 7 propagated by some followers of Professor Henry
Hart, who seek to place state judges on a par with their federal sisters
and brothers. The myth is odd indeed, for it denies that dramatic
differences in selection, tenure, and removal procedures between
state and federal benches translate into predictable long-run differ24 See, e.g.,

H.

FRIENDLY,

FEDERAL JURISDICTION:

A GENERAL

VIEW,

139-52

(1973); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 13, at 1695-700; Currie, The FederalCourts and
the American Law Institute, 36 U. Cm. L. REV. 1, 1-49, 268-89 (1968); Frankfurter,
DistributionofJudicialPowerBetween United States and State Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499,
520-30 (1928); Mishkin, The Variousness of "FederalLaw". Competence and Discretionin the
Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797, 809 (1957);
Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1129 & n.86 (1977); Rowe,
Abolishing Diversity Jurisdiction:Positive Side Effects and Potentialfor Further Reforms, 92
HARV. L. REV. 963 (1979); Wechsler, FederalJurisdictionand the Revision of theJudicial
Code, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 216, 234-40 (1948); Wright, Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S.
Senate, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 45-48 (1978).
25 See generally Amar, A Neo-Federalist View, supra note 9, at 235-38.
26 Indeed, even Martin Redish-a strong critic of the bifurcation thesis-has
acknowledged that the salary and tenure guarantees of article III seem less essential
in diversity than in federal question cases. See Redish, supra note 18, at 152.
27 See generally Neuborne, supra note 24, at 1105 (arguing against claim that
"federal and state trial courts are equally competent forums for the enforcement of
federal constitutional rights").
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ences in decisional outcomes. The framers obviously thought otherwise; they spent a good deal of time and energy carefully specifying
how federal judges would obtain and hold office precisely because
they understood that these factors would affect judges' decisions.
4. The (True) Principle of Parity2"
The "myth of parity" told by followers of Professor Hart
obscures the real principle of parity at the heart of article III-the
structural parity of allfedml judges, supreme and inferior. Structurally, all of these officers are equal to each other (and superior to state
judges) in mode ofappointment, tenure of office, and mechanism of
removal. Nor does the Constitution suggest any textual difference
by giving Supreme Court officers and lower federal court officials
different titles; on the contrary, all are simply described as article III
"judges."' 29 Thus, the modern practice of distinguishing between
Supreme Court "Justices" and lower federal court 'Judges" derives
not from the words of the Constitution, but, as we shall see, from
those of the First Judiciary Act. 30 Still further support for federal
parity derives from the exceptions clause empowering Congress to
shift the last word on any case in the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction to, lower federal courts, either as courts of original jurisdiction or as courts of appeals, even over state courts (consistent
with the principle of structural superiority). Congressional power to
allocate jurisdiction within the federal judiciary is broad indeed; by
either altering the Supreme Court's size, or by making exceptions to
its appellate jurisdiction, the political branches have great power to
choose which article III officers will have the last word on any given
case. Congressional power to take the last word from all federal
judges, however, is far more limited, given the constraints of the
bifurcation and structural superiority principles.
Ironically, even as Pro:Fessor Hart's famous Dialogue on jurisdiction stripping paid insufficient heed to the structural superiority of
federal judges, it also obscured the true parity principle by intimating that-notwithstanding the words of the exceptions clause-certain (ill-defined) "essential" functions could be performed only by
the Supreme Court.3 '
28

See generally Amar, A Neo-Federalist View, supra note 9, at 221-22, 254-58.

29 Except for the "ChiefJustice." See infra text accompanying note 139.
3o See infra text accompanying note 139.

31 See Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit theJurisdictionof FederalCourts: An Exercise
in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1364 (1953).
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5. The Coextensiveness Principle

When combined, the bifurcation and structural superiority principles deny Congress power to give state courts the last word on any
admiralty or federal question case. Congress may allow state courts,
if authorized by state constitutions, to exercise original jurisdiction
in any of these cases, but, consistent with holism, only federal courts
are vested with the judicial power of the United States-the power to
speak in the name of the nation, definitively and finally on federal law.
The correctness of this holistic reading of article III is confirmed by
two additional principles which, when combined, yield an identical
conclusion.
The first, the coextensiveness principle, asserts that federal
executive and judicial power are coextensive with federal legislative
power. Wherever Congress can legislate, the executive must have
coordinate authority to execute, and the judiciary to adjudicate.
Laws passed by the nationallegislature shall be approved and implemented by a nationalexecutive and expounded definitively by national
judges. A congressional effort to shift final interpretive authority
from federal to state courts is no more structurally supportable than
a parallel effort to shift the President's power to veto laws to state
governors.
The coextensiveness principle derives from more than the textual point that the judicial power is vested not in Congress, but in
federal courts, and the structural observation that the opening "shall
be vested" lines of articles I, II and III establish three equal and
coordinate branches. Underlying this textual vesting and structural
symmetry is a root principle of the rule of law. The framers designed
the separation and coordinacy of powers to ensure that federal laws
would be prospective and general. Interpretation by an impartial
and independent federal judiciary would prevent retroactive modification and ensure even-handed application, thereby promoting the
rule of law.3" If the framers had allowed Congress to vest final interpretive authority in state judges who might lack both competence
and independence, it would be easy to circumvent this careful separation of powers.3 4 Although Congress need not legislate in a given
32

See generally Amar, A Neo-Federalist View, supra note 9, at 231-34, 250-52.

33 See id., and sources cited therein; see also THE FEDERALiST No. 78, at 470 (C.

Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton) ("But it is not with a view to infractions of the
Constitution only that the independence of the judges may be an essential safeguard
against the effects of occasional ill humors in the society.").
34 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 486 (A. Hamilton) ("State judges, holding
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area at all, ifit legislates it must respect the rule of law, by providing
for coextensive federal jurisdiction (at least on appeal).
6.

35
The Principle of Inadequate Political Safeguards

The rule of law's concern about generality and prospectivity
should focus our attention on those parts of article I specially
devoted to assuring these respective values, namely the prohibitions
against bills of attainder and ex post facto laws. And examination of
these prohibitions reveals an interesting fact. The Constitution's
attainder and ex post facto clauses impose limits on both Congress,
in article I, section 9, and state legislatures, in article I, section 10.
This repetition not only confirms the absolute centrality of those
prohibitions to the federalist Constitution; it also shows that the
framers feared that similar majoritarian diseases would afflict all legislatures-including Congress. The framers could have hardly
expected Congress alone to police state legislators-who would,
after all, directly select the Senate and whose electors would automatically decide House races; Congress was itself too political and
dependent to serve as the sole sentry guarding the constitutional
vault from political and parochial state legislators. Conversely, the
framers could not fully trust state judges to police Congress, for both
were likely to be too closely tied to state legislatures and excessively
vulnerable to short-term political pressures. Only federal judges,
protected by their structurally superior tenure, would enjoy the independence, detachment, and competence to disregard the flames of
faction and the passions of temporary majorities.
Thus, precisely because of the "political safeguards of federalism" noted by Professor Herbert Wechsler,3 6 the interests of Congress, state legislators, and state judges (who in 1787 often enjoyed
virtually no independence from their state legislatures) were not sufficiently "adverse." Therefore the Constitution gave federal courts
an indispensable role in policing constitutional rights against these
entities.
The principle of inadequate political safeguards perfectly complements the coextensiveness principle; the former explains the need
their office during pleasure, or from year to year, will be too little independent to be

relied upon for an inflexible execution of the national laws.").
35 See generally Amar, A Neo-Fe.deralist View, supra note 9, at

224-28, 250, 253.
36 See Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the

Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543 (1953).
Professor Wechsler's analysis, of course, was strongly anticipated by James Madison
in The FederalistNos. 45 and 46.
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for federal court jurisdiction (at least on appeal) in all cases arising
under the Constitution, whereas the latter accounts for the analogous imperative in all cases arising under federal laws and treaties.
Taken together, these principles argue for plenary judicial power
over notjust"'arising under" jurisdiction, but also admiralty jurisdiction whenever any federal norms are implicated, as is virtually always
the case in admiralty. (Such cases, do not, of course, fall within the
"arising under" category, which is limited to cases in law and equity
arising under federal law.)
Thus, in tandem, the coextensiveness and political safeguards
principles generate results virtually synonymous with bifurcation.
The only important difference is that bifurcation goes beyond arising
under and admiralty jurisdiction, and further insists that federal
courts be vested with full judicial power over all cases affecting
ambassadors, etc. However, since such cases fall within the Supreme
Court's original, and not appellate, jurisdiction, Congress has no
authority under the exceptions clause or any other clause to remove
them from the Supreme Court. Insofar as the only real debate today
is over the scope of congressional power under the exceptions
clause, the coextensiveness and political safeguards principles, when
combined, simply echo the bifurcation principle's insistence that
every exception in arising under and admiralty cases be offset by
vesting the last word in some lower federal court.
7. Additional Arguments
The foregoing principles all derive directly from the original
Constitution, and thus should have been both relevant and accessible to the first Congress as it pondered the First Judiciary Act. In
addition to these six principles, my 1985 essay offered three additional arguments on behalf of the two-tier thesis that the first Congress would not have considered. First, the two-tier thesis derives
considerable support from the language of classic Marshall Court
opinions on the federal judiciary,3 7 and from important extra-judicial
37 See American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 545 (1828) (Marshall,
CJ.); Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 821-22 (1824)
(Marshall, CJ.) (labelling first tier "most important class"); Cohens v. Virginia, 19
U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 378 (1821) (Marshall, C.J.); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S.
(1 Wheat.) 304, 334-36, 347 (1816); see also Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S.
(12 Pet.) 657, 672-73 (1838) (oral argument); id. at 721 (Baldwin,J.) (Taney Court).
Martin's two-tier analysis also received emphatic endorsement in the House
Judiciary Committee's minority report to an 1831 bill attempting to repeal the
Supreme Court's authority to hear federal question appeals from state courts. The
minority report, submitted by (later President) James Buchanan, W.W. Ellsworth,
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writings of Justice Story3 8 and ChiefJustice Marshall. 9 All of these
early nineteenth century expositions are entitled to considerable
weight today, but they were obviously unavailable to the first
Congress.
Second, the two-tier thesis lays down bright-line rules about
both the affirmative scope and the limits of congressional power over
federal court jurisdiction." ° In contrast to the fuzzier "essential
function" tests propounded by Professor Hart 4 and some of his followers, 4 2 the two-tier thesis identifies a determinate boundary
between what Congress may do consistently with article III, and what
it may not. Such crispness is especially valuable for judges seeking
"mediating principles" 4 3 to implement constitutional values in case
by case adjudication; crispness enhances predictability, reduces
opportunities for abuse of judicial discretion, gives lower courts
greater guidance, and enables adjudication to appear more "legal"
and less "political." But the preference for bright-line rules is one
and E.D. White, was in turn emphatically embraced by the entire House, which
overwhelmingly defeated the bill by a 138 to 51 vote. See Warren, supra note 1, at

164. The ten page report explicitly invokes "the very able and conclusive argument
of the Supreme Court" in Martin and Cohens (the only opinions cited), and
emphasizes over and over again the phrase "all cases"-four times in italics. See H.R.
REP. No. 43, 21st Cong., 2d Sess. 11-20 (1831). The minority report plainly argues
that repeal would be not simply unwise but unconstitutional. See also F. FRANKFURTER
& J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 44 n.143 (1928) (labelling the

report "one of the famous documents of American constitutional law").
38 See supra note 9 (quoting § 1696 of Story's Commentaries). Story later wrote
that ChiefJustice Marshall, to whom the Commentaries were dedicated, "approved all
[its] doctrines." 2 W. STORY, LIFE AND LETrERS OF JOSEPH STORY 274 (1851)
(reprinting Letter from Joseph Story to court reporter Richard Peters (June 14,
1837)).
39 See Marshall, A Friend of the Constitution, in JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF
MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 204, 212-14 (G. Gunther ed. 1969); see also 1 J. KENT,
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 298 (1st ed. 1826).
Marshall's extra-judicial statements should perhaps also include the two-tiered
language of Martin itself, in which Marshall recused himself but may well have helped
behind the scenes in drafting the language of "Story's" opinion. See G.E. WHITE,
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE MARSHALL COURT AND

CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-35, at 173 n.66 (1988).
40 See Amar, A Neo-FederalistView, supra note 9, at 230 n.86.
41 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
42 See, e.g., Ratner, CongressionalPower Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157, 160-68 (1960) (noting that "denying the Court
jurisdiction to review any cases involving [certain] subjects would effectively
obstruct" the Court's essential functions as mandated by the Constitution); cf. Amar,
A Neo-Federalist View, supra note 9, at 220-22 (describing and critiquing Ratner's
thesis).
43 Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 107-08

(1976).
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intimately bound up with special institutional needs of courts,4 4 and
thus would be less relevant to a legislature free to examine the Constitution directly, without the simplifying distortions introduced by
judicial mediating principles.4 5
Finally, I argued in 1985 that the two-tier thesis continued to
make sense, two centuries after Philadelphia-that, if anything, intervening events only made the thesis more sensible. 4 6 These events
include the adoption of the Civil War amendments, the expansion of
individual rights against governments (especially state governments), the attenuation of the importance of diversity jurisdiction
after Erie, and the legislative recognition of the heightened importance of federal question jurisdiction in federal courts.
Central to my argument about post-ratification American history
was my claim that, beginning with the First Judiciary Act, congressional statutes had always reflected the basic principles underlying
the two-tier thesis, with de minimis exceptions. We are now in a
position to reassess that claim, at least insofar as it concerns the Judiciary Act of 1789.
B.

The FirstJudiciary Act Revisited

It is somewhat ironic that one of the most "difficult questions"
the two-tier thesis raises for the editors of Hart & Wechsler stems from
the allegedly "significant" inconsistencies between the thesis and the
provisions of the First Judiciary Act. In language that continues to
be excluded from the casebook, even in its much-improved third
incarnation, Joseph Story concluded his two-tier analysis in Martin by
noting that it was
also worthy of remark that congress seem, in a good degree, in the
establishment of the present judicial system, to have adopted this
distinction [between the two tiers of article III jurisdiction] ....
[This distinction has] been brought into view in deference to the
legislative opinion,
which has so long acted upon, and enforced,
47
this distinction.
44 See P. BREST & S. LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTrTUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING

49-50 (2d ed. 1983); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 124-25 (1980). The value of
such bright lines is perhaps at its peak when the judiciary must convince the cynic
that it is not simply protecting its own political turf when it tells Congress "thus far
may you strip our powers but no further."
45 See Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27
STAN. L. REV. 585, 586-89 (1975); Sager, FairMeasure: The Legal Status of Underenforced

ConstitutionalNorms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1213-28 (1978).
46 See Amar, A Neo-Federalist View, supra note 9, at 247 n.134, 265-69.
47 Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 336. Justice Story in this passage also makes
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Thus, Story seemed to view the Act as strongly supporting the twotier thesis, rather than raising "difficult questions" for it. Indeed,
Story's entire two-tier analysis was anticipated at oral argument by
Martin's attorney, Walter Jones, who also saw the two-tier thesis as
drawing support from the First Judiciary Act: "The constitution, art.
3., sec. 2., has distinguished between the causes properly national
[i.e., "all cases"], and 'controversies' which it was thought expedient
to vest in the courts of the United States. The judiciary act covers
the first completely, the la;t only partially." 48
A fresh look at the Act will answer Hart & Wechsler by confirming
Story and Jones. In its general structure and in a great many of its
specific provisions, the Act validates the main tenets of Story's twotier thesis, as revised and elaborated in 1985. Admittedly, the Act is
perhaps not perfectly consistent, in every jot and tittle, with the twotier thesis, but few things in life-and especially in law-are perfect.
Contrary to Hart & Wechslr's intimations, the "gaps" that the Act
created in first-tier cases-if gaps they be-are not truly
"'significant."
It must also be noted that the powerful microscopic lens Hart &
Wechsler uses to reveal and magnify "significant" inconsistencies
between the Act and the two-tier thesis reveals equally "significant"
problems with the Act under any currently held article III theory. At
this ultra-high level of magnification, the Act simply cannot withstand scrutiny unscathed, for it seems to have unconstitutional features under any plausible reading of article III. Indeed, some of the
very holes Hart & Wechsler notes, far from being uniquely in tension
with the two-tier thesis, are equally in tension with the explicit language of the historic centerpiece of Hart & Wechsler itself-the legendary Dialogue of the late Henry Hart-and with the overwhelming
consensus opinion of today's bench and academy. Thus, if these
holes prove anything, they prove too much-or rather, they prove
only that perfect consistency with the Act of 1789 cannot be the ultimate touchstone for our interpretations of article III. (That article
is, of course, a separate text unto itself with lexically superior status.)
Thus, while it would be literally true to say that "some details of the
passing reference to "subject mater" limitations created by Congress in first tier
cases-no doubt a reference to the common-law "savings clause" of § 9 and perhaps
also to the language limiting § 25 review to those issues that "immediately respect[]"
the federal questions presented. See infra text accompanying notes 81-112.
48 See 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 321; 1 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED
STATES HISTORY 448 (1928). Jones holds the all-time record for most Supreme Court
oral arguments (317). See infra note 222.
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Act of 1789 are embarrassing to Story's and Amar's two-tier thesis,"
it would be equally true-and far less misleading-simply to say that
"some details of the Act of 1789 are embarrassing."
1. The Holistic Principle
The First Judiciary Act's general structure stands dramatically
opposed to those contemporary scholars who seek to divide and conquer article III by treating congressional power over lower federal
courts as a wholly separate issue from congressional power over the
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. Inferior federal court original jurisdiction, inferior federal court appellate jurisdiction (over
both state courts, via removal, 4 9 and other federal courts, via writs of
error and appeal), Supreme Court original jurisdiction, Supreme
Court appellate jurisdiction (again, over both state and federal
courts)-all are dealt with together in a single, comprehensive and
integrated bill. The myriad internal cross-references-flagged by
words 5 2such as "herein after," 5
"before-mentioned,"'" and
"said" -further confirm the interconnectedness of the Bill's various sections that, under a divide-and-conquer approach, present
wholly unrelated doctrinal issues. These cross-references are intricate and at times confusing-on July 3, 1789, Joseph Jones wrote to
James Madison that "the different powers and jurisdictions of the
Courts would have been more clearly seen had they been taken up in
several bills, each describing the province and boundary of the Court
to which it particularly applied.""3 Yet the decision of the first
Congress not to chop the unitary judicial branch into separate
statutes-even at the expense of some added complexity-only
underscores the Act's deep commitment to holism. Today we may
take for granted the fact that S-l dealt with federal courts as a whole,
but we do so only at the risk of blinding ourselves to much of the
significance of the Act, and of article III.
The Act's very title-"An Act to establish the Judicial
Courts of
the United States"-adds still further support to the holism principle's insistence on looking at the judicial power of the United States
as a whole, vested in federal courts. Holism also insists that,
although state courts may exercise original jurisdiction in various
49 See infra text accompanying notes 118-26.

50 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 10, 11, 13, 1 Stat. 73.

51 Id. § 14.
52 Id. § 15.
-53 12 THE PAPERS OFJAMES MADISON 276 (C. Hobson & R. Rutland eds. 1979)
(reprinting Letter from Joseph Jones to James Madison (July 3, 1789)).
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article III categories, these courts may not, strictly speaking, be
vested with the judicial power of the United States. The Act scrupulously adheres to this distinction. Only federal courts are "establish[ed];" only federal courts are vested with jurisdiction (typically
through the use of the mandatory word "shall" 54 -the very same
word whose mandatory force is denied by selective literalists playing
divide-and-conquer with article III). State concurrent jurisdiction is
recognized, but not "vested" or "conferred"; nowhere does the Act
command that state courts "shall" have jurisdiction.
2.

The Bifurcation Principle

Article III requires not only that the judicial power of the United
States be vested only in federal courts, but also that that very same
judicial power extend to "all" cases in the first tier, but not necessarily to all "controversies" in the second tier. If we look only at original jurisdiction, it might seem as if the Act favored diversity over
federal questions; but if we instead look holistically at federal judicial
power in the aggregate, a very different picture emerges. As I
explained in 1985:
The firstJudiciary Act created major exceptions to plenary federal jurisdiction over all party-defined cases. Where the Constitution permits the federal judicial power to extend to "Controversies
between citizens of different States" the Act gave federal courts
original jurisdiction only in cases involving more than $500-no
small sum in the eighteenth century-and only where the suit was
one between "a citizen of the State where the suit is brought and a
citizen of another state." Moreover, such jurisdiction was nonexclusive. Removal from state court was permitted only in a limited
number of cases (again involving a $500 minimum amount) and no
diversity case proceeding to judgment in a state court was appealable [as such] to a federal court. Where the Constitution permitted
jurisdiction in cases "to which the United States shall be a Party,"
the Act conferred jurisdiction on federal courts only where the
United States was party-plaintiff, and then only where "the matter
in dispute" amounted to more than $100, exclusive of costs. Once
again this jurisdiction was concurrent with the states, from whose
decisions no appeal to federal courts would lie. In cases involving
land grants under different states, the federal courts were given
power to hear only a limited number of cases removed from state
courts; once again a $500 minimum blocked the doors of the federal judiciary.
54 SeeJudiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 9-13, 1 Stat. 73.
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The Act's treatment of cases in the mandatory tier was far different. Federal District Courts were vested with plenary and exclusive jurisdiction to hear "all civil causes of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction" regardless of the amount in controversy. The
Supreme Court was endowed under the Act with exclusive jurisdiction over "all... suits or proceedings againstambassadors, or other
public ministers, or their domestics, or domestic servants" and
nonexclusive jurisdiction of "all suits brought by ambassadors, or
other public ministers, or in which a consul, or vice consul shall be
a party." Lower federal courts were granted exclusive cognizance
of federal crimes, while the Supreme Court was given plenary
appellate review, under the famous section 25, over all state court
decisions which defeated rights set up by the appellant under the
Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States. Thus, in the
mandatory tier, state courts were not permitted to be the last
word. 55
Since 1985, various scholars have sought to offer nonbifurcated
readings of the 1789 Act. Professor Robert Clinton, for example,
has read article III as requiring that all nine categories of cases of
controversies be fully vested in federal courts, at least on appeal.5 6
Clinton tries to soften the rigor of his unitary principle by introducing the possibility of de minimis exceptions to his unitary and
mandatory thesis and then argues that the Judiciary Act of 1789 basi57
cally supports his thesis.
The biggest problem with Clinton's argument about the Act
derives from the above-mentioned limitations on diversity and landgrant cases. Clinton argues that the $500 hurdle set up by the Act
was de minimis, but $500 was a hefty sum in 1789. As Senator William Paterson wrote in his notes on the Act, "The Farmers in the
New England States [are] not worth more than 1,000 Ds. on an Average.",5 ' Examination of contemporaneous dollar limits elsewhere
further undercuts Clinton's characterization of $500 as de minimis.
When the first Congress sought to qualify its proposed constitutional
right to a civil jury with a de minimis amount-in-dispute require55 Amar, A Neo-Federalist View, supra note 9, at 260-62 (citations and footnotes
omitted).
56 See, e.g., Clinton, supra note 18; Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court
Jurisdiction:Early Implementation of and DeparturesFrom the ConstitutionalPlan, 86 COLUM.
L. REv. 1515, 1516-22 (1986).
57 See generally Clinton, supra note 56, at 1522-52.
58 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 1789-91, at 481

(K. Bowling & H. Veit eds. 1988) (reprinting notes of William Paterson on judiciary
Act of 1789) [hereinafter Notes of William Patterson].
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ment, it chose $20-a far cry from $500.' 9 That amendment, of
course, was passed by Congress the very same week as the Judiciary
Act.

60

Even more significant, when Congress turned to federal question appeals from state courts to the U.S. Supreme Court under section 25, it chose a truly de ninimis amount-in-dispute requirement:
zero. As Paterson's notes explained, "If a small Sum [is in dispute,
nevertheless] it may involve a Question of Law of great Importance,
and should be liable to be removed."" Paterson's notes at this point
make reference to the celebrated British case of John Hampden,
whose refusal to pay a mere twenty shillings of ship money tax generated a momentous lawsuit raising fundamental, constitutional ques62
tions about the respective authority of Charles I and Parliament.
The framers of the Judiciary Act understood that federal questions by
their very nature and subject matter, were not de minimis. Diversity
cases, on the other hand, were by their nature far less significant,
since jurisdiction derived not from the dispute's legal subject matter,
but merely from the identity of its parties. Thus, large amount-indispute holes could be cut out of diversity jurisdiction, but none
were appropriate for federal questions.6 3
59 See U.S. CONST. amend VII.
60 See J. GOEBEL, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 454-55, 506-07 (1971).
61 Notes of William Paterson, supra note 58, at 481.
62 See id. In opposition to a proposed constitutional amendment

to limit appeals
to the Supreme Court to cases involving more than one thousand dollars,
Representative Egbert Benson said that "the question in controversy might be an
important one, though the action was not to the amount of a thousand dollars."
Samuel Livermore likewise found the clause "objectionable, because it
comprehended nothing more than the value." I ANNALS OF CONG. 784 (J. Gales ed.
1789) (1st ed. pagination) (Note that there are two editions of the Annals of Congress
and that this Article cites to a different edition than does Professor Meltzer's article.).
The amendment ultimately died in the Senate. See also 12 PAPERS OFJAMES MADISON,
supra note 53, at 418-19 (reprinting Letter from James Madison to Edmund
Pendleton (Sept. 23, 1789)) (Senate views proposed "limitation on the value of
appeals to the Supreme Court . . .unnecessary, and might be embarrassing in
questions of national or constitutional importance in their principle, tho' of small
pecuniary amount"); cf. I THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 323, 326 (J. Elliot ed. 1888) [hereinafter
ELLIOT'S DEBATES] (proposed amendments by Massachusetts and New Hampshire
ratifying conventions establishing minimal dollar limits for federal jurisdiction, but
only for diversity cases).
63 Professor Casto argues that in many cases involving small sums, "an appeal
to the distant Supreme Court would ... not be worth the candle." Casto, The First
Congress's Understandingof Its Authority Over the FederalCourts'Jurisdiction,26 B.C.L. REV.
1101, 1119 (1985). This argument should not be pushed too hard, as it is in mild
tension with Casto's own invocation of Hampden's case, a case that illustrates how
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Because Clinton's unitary account gives him no handle with
which to distinguish federal questions from diversity, he is forced
into a number of awkward positions. First, he ends up obscuring a
major structural feature of the Act of 1789-the differential dollar
limits between first tier cases and second tier controversies. Second,
Clinton must stretch the notion of "de minimis" to its breaking
point, and perhaps beyond. Third, his expanded concept of "de
minimis" creates a cancer in the center of his mandatory theory that
he cannot prevent from spreading to healthy and vital tissue-federal question jurisdiction. The Act of 1789 did a far better job of
protecting that tissue than does Professor Clinton.
Ironically, Clinton's unitary exposition itself contains seeds of
bifurcation, for Clinton treats federal question jurisdiction prior to
and separately from all other categories.' Yet this promising move,
based perhaps on eminently sound and deep-seated (but never
articulated) structural intuitions about the primacy of federal question jurisdiction, never ripens into discussion (or even, seemingly,
awareness) of the bifurcation alternative.
Professor Clinton's is not the only unitary alternative to the
bifurcation thesis. Whereas Clinton's unitary account sees virtually
all federal jurisdiction as mandatory, other unitary accounts treat virtually all federal jurisdiction as subject to plenary congressional control. Perhaps the most distinguished living exponent of this view is
Professor Herbert Wechsler; 5 and the third edition of the remarkaparties may litigate issues that involve small sums where matters of high principle are
at stake. Cf. id. at 1110-11. Thus, the key point to be emphasized is that litigants with
small claims had a legal right to take their federal questions to the Supreme Court,
although they could of course choose to waive that right, just as they could of course
choose to forego litigation in the first instance. What's more, Casto's observations
about distance and expense are wholly consistent with the two-tier thesis, which is at
pains to affirm broad congressional power to choose when, where, and in front of which
article III officer(s) federal rightholders are to have their constitutionally guaranteed
day in federal court. See Amar, A Neo-Federalist View, supra note 9, at 254-59; Amar,
Section 13, supra note 15.
64 Compare Clinton, supra note 56, at 1541-44 ("Federal Question Jurisdiction")
with id. at 1544-52 ("Other Enumerated Jurisdictional Grants").
65 For instance, Professor Wechsler has opined:
[Tjhe plan of the Constitution for the courts ... was quite simply that the
Congress would decide from time to time how far the federal judicial
institution should be used within the limits of the federal judicial power;
or, stated differently, how far judicial jurisdiction should be left to the
state courts, bound as they are by [the supremacy clause]. Federal courts,
including the Supreme Court, do not pass on constitutional questions
because there is a special function vested in them to enforce the
Constitution or police the other agencies of government.
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ble casebook that bears his name continues to exhibit strong traces
of his influence. 6 6 As with my critique of Professor Clinton, the third
edition notes that the Act of 1789 left "large gaps in federal jurisdiction";6 7 the book at this point cites a 1985 article by Professor William Casto, 6 8 which placed considerable emphasis on the $500
requirement. The third edition goes on to argue that the Act also
left other "significant ' 69 gaps even in first tier cases. It is here that I
part company.
Let us first consider Hart & Wechsler's reminder that in several

respects the language of section 13 concerning ambassadors seems
less comprehensive than the corresponding language of article IIIlanguage that under the bifurcation thesis is mandatory.7 0 As I
pointed out in 1985, the technical discrepancies between section 13
and article III are indeed somewhat embarrassing to the two-tier thesis; 7 1 however, the two-tier thesis is hardly unique in this respect. As

noted above, "all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls" fall within the Supreme Court's original, not appellate,
Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1001, 1005-06 (1965).
66 The third edition, however, also exhibits other, contrary traces. See generally
Amar, Law Story, supra note 9, at 711-14.
67 HART & WECHSLER, supra note 13, at 386.
68 Id. at 386 n.38 (citing Casto, supra note 63). Notwithstanding Hart &
Wechsler's credentialing of, and apparent reliance on, Casto's "exhaustive study,"
HART & WECHSLER, supra note 13, at 366, 386 nn.38 & 40, Professor Casto's work is
seriously flawed in its grasp of both general principles and many specific details. At a
general level, Professor Casto reveals deep misunderstandings of the principles of
holism and bifurcation underlying both article III and the Act of 1789. He claims:
It is evident.., that Congress made no attempt whatsoever to mesh the
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction with the limitations on the lower
courts' original jurisdiction . . . . If the idea of aggregate vesting is
historically accurate, one would expect Congress to have made some
effort to coordinate the federal courts' jurisdictions. No such effort was
made.
Casto, supra note 63, at 1118. He also states:
To reconcile [the limitations enacted by the first Congress] with a theory
of mandatory vesting, one must assume that some of the heads ofjurisdiction in the Constitution are mandatory but others-most notably diversity
and alienagejurisdiction-are not. Article III does not suggest this hierarchy, nor has any historical evidence been adduced to support such a
constitutional doctrine.
Id. at 1125. For examples of less sweeping misstatements, see infra notes 102, 169,
197-202 and accompanying text.
69 HART & WECHSLER, supra note 13, at 386.
70 See id. at 386 n.41. The editors also note that some of the original jurisdiction
under section 13 was only concurrent. For a discussion of this issue, see Amar,
Section 13, supra note 15, at 492 n.219.
71 See Amar, A Neo-Federalist View, supra note 9, at 261 n.183, 264 n.194.
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jurisdiction, and thus are not subject to congressional power under
the exceptions clause. Nor is there any other obvious source of congressional authority to deprive the Supreme Court of jurisdiction
over those courts. Hence, Professor Martin Redish-a harsh critic of
my own two-tier thesis-is himself on record as acknowledging that
the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction over all ambassador cases
is off limits to Congress. 7 2 Professor Henry Hart's celebrated Dialogue is to similar effect: "It's hard, for me at least, to read into Article III any guarantee to a civil litigant of a hearing in a federal
constitutional court (outside the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court)."" The discussion of original jurisdiction by these scholars
is sotto voce, but far from idiosyncratic, for virtually no modem scholars or judges have argued that Congress can tamper with the Court's
irreducible core of original jurisdiction over ambassador casesjurisdiction universally acknowledged to derive directly from the
Constitution itself.'4
Thus, the technical discrepancies between section 13 and article
III do raise "difficult questions" for the two-tier thesis, but they raise
equally "difficult questions" for virtually all other widely held theories of article III, including the one most prominently associated with
Hart & Wechsler itself. Indeed, as I shall now show, the original jurisdiction puzzle presents far more "difficult questions" for Hart &
Wechsler than for the two-tier theory.
First, the original jurisdiction issue demonstrates that seemingly
unitary accounts arrayed against Story's two-tier thesis are often not
so unitary, for they themselves bifurcate article III into mandatory
and permissive tiers by distinguishing between Supreme Court original and appellate jurisdiction. Usually this bifurcation is acknowledged quickly and quietly. There are good tactical reasons for such
gingerliness, for one would be hard pressed indeed to develop
strong structural reasons for seeing all cases in the Supreme Court's
original jurisdiction as qualitatively more important than all cases in
its appellate jurisdiction-including the all-important federal question category. If the question is not "shall we bifurcate article III?"
but rather, "which bifurcation theory makes the most sense of the
article's text, history, and structure?" then much of the structural
72 M. REDIsH, FEDERALJURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF FEDERAL

POWER 12 (1980); Redish, CongressionalPower, supra note 20, at 901.
73 Hart, supra note 31, at 1372-73.
74 I am on record, however, as arguing that Congress can restrict Supreme
Court original jurisdiction over state party cases. See Amar, A Neo-FederalistView, supra
note 9, at 254 n.160; Amar, Section 13, supra note 15, at 478-88; see also infra note 222.
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elegance of the (false) unitary account is lost; things are not quite so
simple as the rhetoric of "plenary congressional power" and "complete parity between state and federal courts" might suggest.7 5
The editors of the third edition seem subtly to obscure this
point, for one of the additional "difficult questions" they raise about
my 1985 essay is, "Why did the drafters of Article III single out cases
affecting ambassadors, etc., for mandatory treatment and leave Con76
gress an option in cases in which the United States was a party?"
There are many possible answers-and in language that is still
expunged from Hart & Wechsler, Story in Martin offered a couple of
them. 77 Nonetheless this is a hard question-but, once again, it is a
hard question that Hart & Wechsler needs to ask itself, for Hart's Dialogue apparently concurs in the judgment of Martin (but not its opinion) on this point. Under both Hart & Wechsler's historic approach
and my own, ambassador jurisdiction is qualitatively different from
U.S. party jurisdiction-in the Dialogue because of the distinction
between Supreme Court original and appellate jurisdiction, and in
my theory because of the distinction between "all cases" and
''controversies."
Yet all this raises a second and far more troubling point about
Hart & Wechsler's traditional approach. Why does the Dialogue apparently acknowledge that article III does "guarantee" litigants rights to
the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction in certain cases? Why is
there virtual consensus in the judiciary and academy today that one
Supreme Court is constitutionally necessary, that the Court derives
its original jurisdiction directly from the Constitution, and that Congress may not deprive the Court of such jurisdiction over all ambassador cases? 78 The answer presumably is that the Constitution says
that "[i]n all cases affecting Ambassadors, . . . the Supreme Court
shall have original jurisdiction."7 9 But if we are supposed to take
75 Consider again, for example, Professor Wechsler's language quoted supra
note 65. And compare Redish, Congressional Power, supra note 20, at 901 (aside on
immunity of Supreme Court original jurisdiction from congressional cuts) with
Redish, supra note 18, at 152 (endorsing sweeping theory of congressional
jurisdiction stripping power, based in considerable part on claim that state courts are
"in fact independent" vis-a-vis Congress).
76 HART & WECHSLER,supra note 13, at 386-87.
77 See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 334-36; see also 3 J.
STORY, supra note 9, § 1668 n.2 (noting that U.S. party suits were omitted from
original draft Constitution in Philadelphia Convention).
78 But see supra note 74 (discussing original jurisdiction over state party cases).
79 See, e.g., Redish, CongressionalPower, supra note 20, at 901 & n.7 (relying on
wording of original jurisdiction clause); cf.id. at n.6 (relying on, and adding emphasis
to, "shall be vested" language). The selectivity with which Professor Redish invokes
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seriously the words "shall" and "all" in this clause-and also in the
First Judiciary Act-how can we ignore the mandatory purport of
these same words in the "shall be vested" and "shall extend to all"
clauses? 8" There is very little extended discussion of original jurisdiction among Professor Hart's disciples, and with good reason. If
they focused on the issue, these scholars would either have to recant
their (perhaps too hasty) concessions about the Court's original
jurisdiction and make arguments in the teeth of the text of article
III's original jurisdiction clause, or else would openly reveal themselves as selective literalists.
Let us now turn from ambassador cases to a second "significant" gap identified by Hart & Wechsler s8 the language of section 9
vesting federal district courts with plenary and exclusive jurisdiction
to hear all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction "saving
to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law remedy, where the
common law is competent to give it." It is not clear why this language creates any gap at all, much less a "significant" one, in the
mandatory tier. As I noted in 1985, the savings clause deals only
with cases at common law, which by definition are not cases in8 admi2
ralty, and thus by definition seem to fall outside the first tier.
Strictly speaking, the Judiciary Act denied state courts the last
the mandate of this clause is curious indeed, and never explained. Nor does Redish's
comment on the present essay clear up the confusion; the issue is simply not
addressed. See Redish, Text, Structure, and Common Sense in the InterpretationofArtice III,
138 U. PA. L. REv. 1633 (1990).
80 Cf. Amar, A Neo-FederalistView, supra note 9, at 239-40 n. 118. In his comment
on the present essay, Professor Meltzer argues that the original jurisdiction "shall"
has "a more imperative ring." See Meltzer, The History and Structure of Article III, 138
U. PA. L. REv. 1569, 1597 (1990). The only real reason he gives is that other words
of article III confirm the mandatory nature of "shall" in the original jurisdiction
clause. I agree-and for the same substantive reason, see Amar, Section 13, supra note
15, at 463-69,---but the same is true of "shall be vested" and "shall extend," see
Amar, A Neo-Federalist View, supra note 9, at 231-32 & n.88, 239-42 & nn.118-22. In
particular, the "shall be vested" clauses of articles I and II have far more dramatic
implications for article III than Meltzer acknowledges. Compare id. at 222-28, 231-33
& nn.91-96, 239 n. 118 with Meltzer, supra, at 1573 n.14, 1597. Thus, I continue to
find the Hart school analysis of this issue incomplete and unpersuasive.
I am also at a loss to see how Meltzer can think it "plausible" that any Judiciary
Act gaps in the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction are more embarrassing to my
theory than to his. See Meltzer, supra, at 1596. Any gap in ambassador cases is equally
embarrassing, and any holes in state party cases, see id. at 1608 n.138; but cf.Amar,
Section 13, supra note 15, at 492 n.219, are embarrassing only to "traditionalists" like
Meltzer, see supra note 74.
81 HART & WECHSLER, supra note 13, at 386.
82 See Amar, A Neo-Federalist View, supra note 9, at 261 n.182; see also 3 J. STORY,
supra note 9, § 1666 n.3; id. § 1683 ("[A] suit in the admiralty is not, correctly
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word-indeed, denied them any word-in admiralty cases as such. To
be sure, a state court adjudication of common law issues under the
savings clause might as a practical matter give a potential federal
admiralty libelant virtually the same relief that he could get in federal
admiralty court, but that is not enough to turn the state case into an
admiralty case, or create a hole in mandatory federal admiralty jurisdiction. Analogously, if a potential federal question litigant chooses
to pursue only state law claims in state court, that case does not necessarily arise under federal law, and no hole in mandatory federal
question jurisdiction is necessarily opened-even if the state court
gives the plaintiff virtually the same relief she might have gotten
under federal law in federal court.8 3
Perhaps Hart & Wechsler is implicitly suggesting that the article
III language "all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction" is best
read as covering all maritime cases, whether or not they are brought
in admiralty. This is surely a plausible reading, but so is the alternative reading that maritime cases must be in admiralty as well before
they come within the scope of the language. The clause, after all,
speaks of "admiralty and maritime jurisdiction," not of "admiralty or
speaking, a suit in law, or in equity; but is often spoken of in contradistinction to
both.").
Professor Meltzer himself appears to explicitly concede this point when he
properly acknowledges that to lawyers of 1789, steeped in the writ system, savings
clause cases were most assuredly not the same "action" as federal admiralty libels.
See Meltzer, supra note 80, at 1594. Each form of action had its own distinctive
history, rules of pleadings, mode of assertion, and procedural incidents. For
example, most "savings clause" actions provided for jury trials; admiralty libels did
not.
Another possible gap, which Hart & Wechsler does not mention, is § 9's limitation
to civil admiralty cases. There is, of course, an obvious explanation: section 9
elsewhere gave district courts "exclusively of the courts of the several States,
cognizance of all [petty] crimes and offences that shall be cognizable under the
authority of the United States, committed within their respective districts, or upon
the high seas;" and § II gave circuit courts "concurrent" jurisdiction over these
offenses, and "exclusive cognizance of all crimes and offences cognizable under the
authority of the United States, except where this act otherwise provides"-e.g., in § 9
and § 13. SeeJudiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 9-13, 1 Stat. 73 (emphasis added). For
a discussion of the knotty issues of federalism and separation of powers raised by
criminal admiralty jurisdiction, see IJ. KENT, supra note 39, at 319-21, 337-42.
83 To the extent that federal pre-emption issues are lurking in the background
of any state court adjudication, arising under jurisdiction may well be implicated, as I
discuss infra text accompanying notes 99-112. But it seems odd to argue that the
savings clause itself creates impermissible holes in federal jurisdiction, since savings
clause cases, like all other state court cases, were subject to Supreme Court review
under § 25. If, as I argue below, § 25 created virtually no gap at all in arising under
cases, there is no § 9 problem. Alternatively, if § 25 was underinclusive, the problem
resides there, and not in the savings clause as such.
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maritime jurisdiction."84 The conjunctive reading also seems more
compatible with the idea that the framers designed the admiralty
clause as a snug complement to "arising under" jurisdiction, which
was limited to federal question cases "in law and equity."" 5 In any
84 1 do not want to make too much of this textual tidbit in isolation. For
example, in the arising under clause, it would obviously make little sense to require a
single case to be brought simultaneously in law and in equity, although here too, the
Constitution speaks of "and," not "or." By definition, an action at law is not one in
equity, and vice versa. (Indeed, by symmetric logic, I have argued above that
common law savings clause suits are by definition not admiralty actions, see supra note
82 and accompanying text.)
Where does all this leave us? If the words "admiralty" and "maritime" are
indeed synonymous, which Professor Meltzer describes as the conventional view, see
Meltzer, supra note 80, at 1594 n.86, there is no logical difference between the strict
conjunctive ("and") and the disjunctive ("or") readings. Under this view, since
savings clause suits are by definition not "admiralty," by transitivity they are also not
"maritime." Cf. De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Gas. 418, 442-43 (C.C.D. Mass 1815) (No.
3,776) (Story, J) ("and maritime" added, out of abundance of caution, to underscore
breadth of the admiralty in America); Note on the Admiralty, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 106,
115 (1820) (ghost authored by Story) (similar). If, alternatively, the words have
different meanings, it nevertheless would be odd to see them as mutually exclusive in
the same way "law" and "equity" are, especially given the conventional view that
"admiralty" and "maritime" are at the very least close cousins. Thus, our reason for
rejecting the strict conjunctive reading of "law and equity"-namely, the avoidance
of oxymoron-does not apply in the admiralty context. On the contrary, there are
strong structural and historical reasons for reading "and" strictly in the admiralty
clause-namely, to limit the possible expansion of traditionally juryless admiralty
jurisdiction by imposing an additional "maritime" threshold. Given the history of
British abuse and extension of Vice Admiralty jurisdiction between 1763 and 1776,
and the strong historic attachment to jury trials, the framers quite possibly added
"and maritime" precisely to prevent the severity of ship-law from spilling over onto
dry land. Cf. U.S. CONST.amend. V (creating strictly limited military-law exception to
general requirement of grand jury); id. amend. VI (guaranteeingjury trial in criminal
cases); id. art. III. § 2, cl. 3 (similar); id. amend. VII (guaranteeing civil jury in
common law cases).
85 Thus, the "law and equity" clause illustrates important connections between
the two mandatory categories-connections Meltzer appears to overlook here in his
emphasis on admiralty jurisdiction as primarily concerned with protecting foreigners
rather than assuring coextensiveness. See Meltzer, supra note 80, at 1595. But see
Amar, A Neo-FederalistView, supra note 9, at 253; supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
Elsewhere, Meltzer explicitly addresses the connection between the two categories,
but misses the mark. Once he concedes that federal statutes in admiralty would not
implicate "arising under" jurisdiction," see Meltzer, supra note 80, at 1614 n.167, he
has conceded my main point: the admiralty clause is necessary to assure
coextensiveness. Meltzer tries to downplay the point by suggesting that admiralty
cases involving federal statutes "presumably" comprised only "a small portion" of
admiralty cases, see id, but the basis of this presumption is wholly unclear. How
could the framers know ex ante how much future Congresses would legislate, civilly
and criminally, in admiralty? What's more, even in the absence of a federal statute,
admiralty cases are best understood as arising under truefederaljudge-fashioned law.
Notwithstanding Meltzer's subtle intimations to the contrary, this reading is no less
anachronistic than Erie itself. Both are rooted in the same structural principles of
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event, even if the broader reading of the clause is embraced, it is easy
to see how the first Congress may have read article III more narrowly. Thus, at most, the clause suggests that Congress sought to
obey the obligation to vest plenary "admiralty and maritime jurisdiction" in federal courts but plausibly misunderstood the exact purport of these words.8 6 (As we shall see below, the same thing can be
said about the "significant" gaps in federal question jurisdiction Hart
& Wechsler reads into section 25.)87
Indeed, even this last point may concede too much to skeptics of
the two-tier thesis, for there is another reading of the savings clause
that eliminates the "gap" entirely, even under a broad reading of
article III. The "savings clause" was eventually construed to permit
concurrent (and unreviewable) 8 8 state court jurisdiction in commonlaw cases, thus giving a plaintiff an absolute choice of forum in these
cases. The clause, however, could instead be plausibly read simply
to say that extant common-law remedies would continue in effect,
although they would thereafter be exclusively enforceable in federalcourt.
Although I do not want to push the point too hard, several factors
might be invoked to support this reading. First, the Act by its
explicit terms provided for exclusive federal jurisdiction in all admiralty and maritime cases; let some experts see the eventual gloss
placed on the savings clause as rendering that exclusiveness "totally
illusory." 9 Second, the other clauses of section 9 suggest that when
the first Congress intended! "concurrent" state court jurisdiction, it
used that very word.9" Third, under the words of the savings clause
itself, "[i]t is not a remedy in the common-law [state] courts which is
saved, but a common-law remedy"9 enforceable in federal court
(perhaps on the "law" side of the docket). Fourth, nothing in the
legislative history of the Act suggests that even the anti-federalists
separation of powers (coextensiveness) and federalism. These structural principles
are far from anachronistic-they pervade the federalist Constitution-even though
their precise doctrinal implications for admiralty and diversity may not have been
well and widely understood in 1787-1789. See generally Friendly, In Praiseof Erie-and
Of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 383 (1964).
86 Congressional confusion is especially plausible in light of the intricacies
identified supra note 84.
87 See infra text accompanying notes 94-98.
88 Except under § 25. See supra note 83.
89 Black, Admiralty Jurisdiction: Critique and Suggestions, 50 COLUM. L. REv. 259,
265 (1950) (emphasis deleted).
90 See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73 ("And shall also have

cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several states ....And shall also have
cognizance, concurrent as last mentioned ....").
91 The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411, 431 (1866).
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challenged exclusive federal admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. 92
Fifth, some admiralty scholars have argued that the jurisdictional
allocation eventually read into the savings clause seems to make little
93
sense as a matter of substantive admiralty and maritime policy.
Having considered the "significant" gaps Hart & Wechsler notes
in the ambassador and admiralty categories, let us turn, finally, to the
hole the casebook sees in the most important category of all: arising
under jurisdiction. Hart & Wechsler correctly notes that under the
famous section 25, the Supreme Court had appellate jurisdiction
over state courts only in cases where a federal claim had been denied
below. 94 Yet this requirement derives from a wholly plausible reading of article III's requirement that a mandatory tier case must "arise
under" federal law.95 Under this reading, to have one's own case
"arise under" federal law, one must claim a right rooted in federal
law. Just as a "case" on appeal must continue to be a live case-it
must not be "moot"-so on appeal one's case must continue to
"arise under" federal law; thus, appellant must claim a federal right
that has been denied below-much as a plaintiff at trial today must
claim a federal right before her case will be deemed to "arise under"
federal law under the "well-pleaded complaint" gloss of section
1331.96
This interpretation of "arising under" gains additional strength
when we remember that the structural principles underlying article
III are not principles requiring uniformity-on the contrary, the parity principle allows Congress to vest the last word in unreviewable
lower federal courts, whose decisions might conflict with each other.
The two-tier thesis is rooted in the need to protect substantive federal rights through structural article III safeguards of appointment,
salary, tenure, and so on. Section 25's singleminded focus on claims
of federal right meshes perfectly with this structural approach. Thus,
as with admiralty,9 7 the most that could be said about section 25 is
that Congress sought to obey the obligation to vest plenary "arising
See infra notes 207-15 and accompanying text.
See Black, supra note 89, at 267.
94 See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 13, at 386 n.41. Unfortunately, the
casebook phrases the observation in a misleading and technically imprecise way. See
infra text accompanying note 112.
95 See Amar, A Neo-Federalist Niew, supra note 9, at 262-63.
96 See Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152-53 (1908).
Although Professor Meltzer finds this analogy problematic, Meltzer, supra note 80, at
1587 n.62, his own argument may suffer from anachronism, cf Amar, A Neo-Federalist
View, supra note 9, at 263-64 n.191.
97 See supra text accompanying notes 81-87.
92
93
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under" jurisdiction in federal courts, but plausibly misunderstood
the exact purport of those words-words whose precise contours have
bedeviled even the most eminent jurists and scholars of subsequent
generations.

98

But as with our discussion of the savings clause, even this may
concede too much; even under a broad reading of "arising under,"
the section 25 "gap" is largely, and perhaps wholly, an optical illusion. In virtually every case in which one party argues for a federal
"right," the other side can argue that it has a federal "immunity"which is simply another way of saying that one's opponent has no
federal right. Let me be clear. I am not making the deconstructive
argument that however broadly or narrowly a claim of right is
defined, the argument on the other side is equally plausible. Rather,
I am claiming that if the right is correctly defined,9 9 at the margin,
the interests for expansion and contraction will be in equipoise virtually by definition. Further, each of these interests can always be plausibly described as a federal interest, arising under (to use a loaded
phrase) federal law. Thus, in virtually every case in which a state
court errs' 0 0 in adjudicating a federal law, appellant can plausibly
package her claim of error as one deriving from a violation of her
own federal "right, privilege, or exemption" under the precise language of section 25."l
98

For an assortment of views, see Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353

U.S. 448, 469-84 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Osborn v. Bank of the United
States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 739, 822-28 (1824) (Marshall, CJ.); id. at 871-903
(Johnson, J., dissenting); Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 334-35, 341-42; Mishkin, The
Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 157 (1953); see also 3
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 62, at 572 (remarks of Edmund Randolph at Virginia
ratifying convention) ("What do we mean by the words arisingunder the Constitution?

I conceive this to be very ambiguous.").
Professor Meltzer complicates matters even further by raising the issue of
protectivejurisdiction. See Meltzer, supra note 80, at 1586 n.59. Although he implies

that such jurisdiction raises distinctive problems for my thesis, I am not quite sure
why. Protective jurisdiction derives from the power of Congress to pass substantive
legislation pre-empting state law. Just as Congress can choose not to legislate
substantively in a given field, thereby leaving the field to state law and state courts,
Congress can choose not to confer protective jurisdiction.
99 "Correctly defined," as used here, refers to the perspective of the Supreme
Court.
100 Again, from the Supreme Court's perspective.
101 It might be asked, what is left of the seemingly limiting language of § 25 if

my broad reading is adopted. Cf Meltzer, supra note 80, at 1589. Have I not just
construed away this limiting language? I think not. The limiting language can be
read simply to make clear that only a litigant who lost below may appeal. A party who
fully prevailed below on her federal claims may not invoke § 25. I am indebted to
John Duffy for this point. See also infra note 140 and accompanying text (illustrating
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To be concrete: an overexpansive state court interpretation of,
say, the attainder clause of article I, section 10-that is, one that
gives the individual more than her due and the state less-can be
seen as a state court denial of the state's tenth amendment rights,
rights arising under federal law. (This would be true even before the
tenth amendment was adopted, for that amendment is simply declaratory of a structural truth about the original Constitution. Without
the amendment, a losing state's claim might be structural rather than
textual, but it would be no less federal.) Analogous moves can be
made in all, or virtually all, other cases.1 0 2 Indeed, a comprehensive
survey by Felix Frankfurter and James Landis uncovered only sixteen
cases from 1789 to 1914 (when section 25 was amended) in which
the section 25 "gap" was successfully invoked to defeat Supreme
Court jurisdiction.1 0 3 Thus, section 25 as written was essentially a
trap for unwary lawyers, for it required them to package their claims
of error with great care.
Section 25 also proved a trap for the Supreme Court, which in
several cases failed to acknowledge that the gap was an optical illusion. Hart & Wechsler cites one particularly egregious opinion
authored by Chief Justice Taney, Commonwealth Bank of Kentucky v.
Griffith,"°4 in which the Court held it had no jurisdiction under section 25's "second clause"' 0 5 where the state court below voided state
that the limiting language of the first two clauses of § 25 is redundant under any
reading).
102 To take another example, Professor Casto has argued that § 25, properly
construed, would not reach a case in which "a Connecticut court were to void a
Rhode Island statute as contrary to the federal Constitution." Casto, supra note 63,
at 1118. Yet if this application of the federal Constitution was incorrect-which, by
hypothesis, would be plaintiff-in-error's contention-then the Connecticut court had
wrongly denied effect to a valid Rhode Island law in contravention of the full faith
and credit clause of article IV § 1. (The tenth amendment could also be invoked
here.) Such a case would clearly fall within the reach of § 25, properly construed.
But see infra notes 104-10 and accompanying text (discussing subsequent incorrect
interpretations of § 25).
Elsewhere Casto raises the spectre of state court manipulation of state law to
defeat federal treaty-based rights, and suggests that these cases, too, would fall
outside of § 25. See Casto, supra note 63, at 1119. This is surely a provocative
conclusion in light of the Supreme Court's treatment of the Fairfax Devisee litigation,
including Martin itself-litigation Casto nowhere mentions. Perhaps Casto would
argue that the Court overreached in the Fairfax litigation, but even this claim would
not help him much. On the contrary, it would only show that the Court strained the
language of § 25-quite possibly in order to avoid holding the Act unconstitutional
in its technical details. Cf. Clinton, supra note 56, at 1581 n.243.
103 F. FRANKFURTER &J. LANDIS, supra note 37, at 190 n.20 (citing cases).

104 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 56 (1840).
105 Id. at 57-58.
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bank notes as violations of article I, section 10's language that "No
state ... shall emit bills of credit." Curiously, the Court never mentioned section 25's third clause whose general "right, privilege, or
exemption" language could easily have been read to uphold the
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. Hart & Wechsler cites Griffith
for the proposition that "the Supreme Court itself appears to have
understood that the [section 25] gap was wholly within Congress's
prerogative. '"106 Of course, the obvious counter is that "the
Supreme Court itself also appears to have understood that if a gap
really existed, and if it invaded the inner boundaries of 'arising
under' jurisdiction, then the gap was not within Congress's prerogative. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee."' °7 The casebook's reliance on Griffith
is especially unfortunate because Taney's sloppy opinion never even
engaged counsel's explicit argument that the state court's
overgenerous disposition violated plaintiff-in-error's rights under
the tenth amendment. 10 8 To make matters worse, the facts of Griffith
also implicated a full faith and credit clause issue, for a Missouri state
court had invalidated notes of a Kentucky state bank, although counsel apparently failed to emphasize this issue at oral argument. Thus,
the case seems wrongly decided under any reading of section 25.109
& WECHSLER, supra note 13, at 386 n.41.
Given the emphasis placed on the mandatory tier in Martin and in several
other Marshall Court opinions, see supra note 37, any gap under § 25 must have
seemed far less obvious and important to the Marshall Court than to Professor
Meltzer. See Meltzer, supra note 81), at 1585-93. Meltzer's microscopic focus quite
simply blows this issue out of all proportion.
108 See 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) at 57 (oral argument of John J. Crittenden).
Unfortunately, even as he invoked the tenth amendment, Senator Crittenden appears
to have directed the Court's attention to the first, rather than the third, clause of
§ 25. See id.
I have been unable to locate a copy of Crittenden's brief.
109 After the Missouri state court's ruling in Commonwealth Bank of Ky. v.
Griffith, 4 Mo. 255 (1836), but beFore the Taney Court heard the case, the Taney
Court itself (over Story's vigorous dissent) held that Kentucky bank laws and notes
were constitutionally valid. See Briscoe v. Bank of the Commonwealth of Ky., 36 U.S.
(11 Pet.) 257 (1837). Although Meltzer correctly notes that Story failed to dissent
from Griffith's § 25 holding (whether he concurred is far less clear), there is an obvious
explanation: Story agreed with the Missouri state court below on the constitutional
merits, but knew that his brethren, if they were to take the case, would wrongly (to
Story's mind) reverse.
Elsewhere, Professor Meltzer properly notes that Griffith was not the first case to
read § 25 in (to my mind) a crabbed way. See Meltzer, supra note 80, at 1589-90. But
precisely because of this, and the many problems with Griffith itself, the editors of
Hart & Wechsler would do well to cite these other cases, and not Grffith. But in
virtually every one of these cases, a. in Griffith, it could easily be shown how a careful
lawyer could have packaged an appeal to fall within the precise language of § 25's
third clause.
106 HART
107
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In the end, blame for whatever "gaps" emerged under section 25
should be laid at the feet not of the first Congress, but of subsequent
Supreme Courts and the lawyers who brought cases to them: virtually every one of the sixteen "gaps" cited by Frankfurter and Landis
was due to poor craftsmanship on the part of either counsel or the
Court.110

-

Hart & Wechsler's emphasis on the "significan[ce]" of the wrinkle
of section 25 is especially hard to square with independent scholarship of one of its leading editors, the late Professor Paul Bator. For
he persuasively illustrated how federal interests typically exist on both
sides of a claimed right. 1 ' But if we accept this insight-as I dothen where's the gap? Isn't Hart & Wechsler's language that "the
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over the state courts did not
extend to cases in which the federal claim had been upheld" misleading? 1 2 Whence this premise of only one ("the") federal claim?
Wouldn't it be clearer to speak of how the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction "did extend to cases in which a federal claim had
been upheld whenever an opposing federal claim had been denied
(as is virtually always the case)"?
We have now considered all the "significant gaps" in the
mandatory tier identified by Hart & Wechsler. What is striking, at least
to me, is how much one has to strain one's eyes to see the "gaps"
identified. Many of the apparent gaps emerge simply because Oliver
Ellsworth stubbornly insisted on substituting his own language for
that of article III, even where substitutions were obviously inappropriate (as with ambassador jurisdiction) or awkwardly written (as
with section 25). Many contemporaries criticized the clumsiness of
Ellsworth's language,"' but in the end went along, probably
110 See Ratner, supra note 42, at 185-86; Sager, supra note 18, at 58-60. It does
seem fair, however, to blame the first Congress for clumsy and confusing
draftsmanship. See infra note 140 and accompanying text (illustrating that under any

reading of § 25, the language is awkward).
111 See Bator, The State Courts and FederalConstitutionalLitigation, 22 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 605, 631-35 (1981).
112 HART & WECHSLER, supra note 13, at 386 n.41.
1
See, e.g., 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS, 178991, supra note 58, at 91 (reprinting Diary of William Maclay) [hereinafter Diary of
William Maclay] ("I made a remark where Elsworth [sic] in his diction had varied
from the Constitution. mhis vile Bill is a child of his, and he defends it with the
Care of a parent, even with wrath and anger."); 2 LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF
JAMES IREDELL 333 (G. McRae ed. 1857-58) (reprinting Letter from William Davie to
James Iredell (Aug. 2, 1791)) (Act "defective in point of arrangement" and
"obscurely drawn or expressed"); THE LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF GEORGE READ
481-88 (W. Read ed. 1870) (reprinting Letter from John Dickinson to George Read
(June 24, 1789)) (Bill "most difficult to understand of any legislative bill I have ever
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because, however inelegant, the Act generally approximated article
III where it counted-in the mandatory tier. In the permissive tier,
by contrast, the Act created a $500 hole that, quite literally, was large
enough to ride a team of horses through, given the price of horses in
1789.'14
Thus, as it does the words and structure of article III, the twotier approach seems to fit the Judiciary Act more snugly than its
major "unitary" alternatives, mandatory and permissive.
Contrary to Hart & Wechsler's intimations, basic consistency with
the Judiciary Act is one of the greatest strengths of the two-tier thesis, for the most plausible alternative to it is not Professor Hart's
Dialogue, but Professor Clinton's unitary and mandatory thesis. Followers of the Dialogue simply miss too many of the textual, structural
and historical principles at the heart of article III. Professor Clinton's theory embraces many of these, but is obviously structurally as
well as textually overinclusive in requiring federal jurisdiction in a
good many places where it would be unnecessary and counterproductive-i.e., all diversity cases. The Act of 1789 helps to illustrate this point by the very size of the major gaps in diversity it
sensibly created.
No one understood all this better than Joseph Story. In portions
of Martin, he toyed with a unitary and mandatory argument remarkably similar to Professor Clinton's."' Yet later in the opinion-and
later in life' 6 -Story put forth a more limited, two-tier, mandatory
theory among whose greatest appeals to Story was its basic consistency with the "legislative opinion" 1 1 7 embodied in the First Judiciread"); 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 53, at 274 (reprinting Letter
from Edmund Randolph to James Madison (June 30, 1789)) ("The jurisdiction is
inartificially, untechnically and confusedly worded. Would it not have been sufficient
to have left this point upon the constitution itself? Will the courts be bound by any
definition of authority, which the constitution does not in their opinion warrant?");
id.at 317 (reprinting Letter from Madison to Samuel Johnston (July 31, 1789)) (Bill

"peculiarly complicated & embarrassing").

114 The average price of horses exported from 1790-1792, in current dollars,
was less than $40. R. ROBERTSON &G. WALTON, HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY
128 (4th ed. 1979) (Table 9-2, line 18, cols. 4-5).
The short-lived Judiciary Act of 1801 had a similarly two-tiered structure of
dollar limits. No limits at all were placed on the (plenary) arising under and
admiralty jurisdiction given to lower federal courts, but elsewhere a $400 dollar limit
applied-again with no Supreme Court review of state court decisions except under
§ 25 (which was of course limited! to federal questions). See Act of Feb. 3, 1801,
§§ 11, 13, 2 Stat. 89, 92-93.
115 See supra note 9.
116 See id.
17 Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 336 (1816).
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ary Act. Thus the real Dialogue that should dominate our thinking
about jurisdiction stripping is not Henry Hart's in Hart & Wechsler
but Joseph Story's in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee. And in that Dialogue,
between two different mandatory theories, the Act leads us to the
narrower two-tier approach.
3.

The Structural Superiority Principle

By giving federal judges the last word in all, or virtually all,
mandatory tier cases, the Judiciary Act powerfully underscored the
structural superiority of article III officers. Indeed, this principle was
at work even in permissive tier cases. Section 12 authorized litigants
to remove various diversity and land-grant cases from state court to
federal circuit court, but the Act created no symmetrical removal in
the other direction. As Joseph Story later reminded his readers in
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, removal is, strictly speaking, a mode of
appellate jurisdiction."' Thus the basic teaching of the Act's
removal clauses is that lower federal courts may sit in appellate
review of state courts (even in the permissive tier) but not vice-versa.
Today's Supreme Court could learn a thing or two from the Act
in this respect, for in recent years the Court has taken a series of
steps that reveal a profound misunderstanding of the structural
superiority principle. First, the Court has often indulged in rhetoric
propagating the myth of parity, even as the Court has at other times
spoken more accurately on the subject." 9 Second, the Court has
proliferated a confusing assortment of various abstention doctrines,
and dramatically expanded the scope of many of the individual categories of abstention. 12 0 Not only do many of these decisions smack
of ad hocey, and disregard the spirit and letter of congressional statutes allocating various cases to federal courts, these decisions also
turn the principles of article III and the First Judiciary Act on their
heads by creating what my colleague Owen Fiss has aptly described
121
as "reverse removal" from federal to state courts.

To make matters even worse, the Court has shown great hostility to the idea of lower federal court review of state courts, and has
even given this hostility a new name: Rooker-Feldman.122 The tran118

See id. at 349-50.

119 See generally Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal

Judiciary, 36 UCLA L. REV. 233, 242-55 (1988); Fallon, supra note 4, at 1164-225.
120 See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 13, at 1354-464.
121 Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103, 1134-36 (1977).
122 See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 13, at 1630-38.
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substantiation of Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Company 2 3-a justly forgotten opinion by Justice Van Devanter, nowhere even cited in the
encyclopedic first and second editions of Hart & Wechsler-into a
"classic" 1 2 4 of federal jurisdiction is curious indeed. It is not entirely
clear what Rooker stands for-or more to the point, what the current
Court will say Rooker stands for-but whatever it is, "Rooker-Feldman"
seems either unnecessary or misguided. If it simply means that
lower federal courts cannot act without statutory jurisdiction, well
and good, but we didn't need a fancy new doctrine to tell us that. So
too with the principle that state court adjudications are entitled to
full faith and credit in lower federal court-a principle already
embodied in section 1738. If the doctrine means anything more
than this, it is likely to do far more harm than good in the hands of
the Rehnquist Court. What's more-and more central to our purpose here-Rooker is technically wrong on its own terms for it claims
that under the statutory jurisdictional scheme Congress has created,
federal district courts have only original jurisdiction, never appellate
jurisdiction over state couIrts.1 2 5 But as Story's opinion in Martin
makes clear, lower federal courts havefrom the very beginning exercised
appellate jurisdiction, stricfly speaking, over state courts. Today, the
categories of appellate jurisdiction are far more extensive than in
1789, both dejure (civil rights and federal officer removal) 1 26 and de
facto (habeas corpus, certification, and the England reservation to
1 27
Pullman abstention).
4.

The (True) Principle of Parity

By affirming that lower federal judges, as well as Supreme Court
justices, could hear technical "appeals" from state courts, the Judiciary Act dramatized the true parity principle-the parity of all article
III officers. Once again, we should note the Act's title-"An Act to
establish the Judicial Courts of the United States"-which made no
sharp distinction between supreme and inferior federal tribunals.
123 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
124 HART & WECHSLER, supra note 13, at xxi.
125 Justice Van Devanter declared "The jurisdiction possessed by the District

Courts is strictly original. Judicial Code, § 24." 263 U.S. at 416. Had the Justice
looked a little more carefully, he would have seen an entire chapter of the code

devoted to removal-that is, appellate-jurisdiction of District Courts. See Act of
March 3, 1911, ch. 3, §§ 28-39, 36 Stat. 1036, 1094-99.
126 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442-43 (1973). See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note
13, at 1052-71, 1767-88.
127 See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 13, at 1376-83, 1465-1578.
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Indeed, the true parity principle pervaded the Act. As I explained in
1985:
In addition to its differential treatment of the two tiers of
cases, the Act also established important distinctions between
Supreme Court review of state court decisions on one hand, and of
lower federal courts on the other. No dollar minimum limited
automatic appeals from state courts arising under federal law, but
appellate review over federal circuit courts was limited to civil cases
involving more than $2,000, and was nonexistent in criminal cases.
The lesson of the Act seems dear: lower federal courts could be
trusted with the power of ultimate disposition of cases in the
mandatory tier, but state courts could not.
Indeed, the very structure of the circuit courts created by the
Act dramatized the structural equality of all federal judges. These
courts were staffed not by appointing separate article III judges,
but rather by forming circuit panels in which Supreme Court justices and federal district judges sat together, with each judgeregardless of status-given an equal vote. The Act created no
analogous8 court pairing Supreme Court justices with state
12
judges.
Supreme Court justices not only sat with lower federal court
judges; the justices were themselves simultaneously lower federal court
judges. For if they sat circuit qua Supreme Court justices, a strong
argument could be made that Congress had extended the Court's
original jurisdiction-something that Marbury v. Madison 12 9 later
(and correctly)'3 0 held that Congress could not do. Yet seeing
Supreme Court justices as simultaneously lower court federal judges
as well was possible only because all federal judges were basically
equal in such critical respects as appointment, tenure and removal.
To see this point most clearly, remember that the first Congress
did not attemp't to make state judges simultaneously lower federal
judges. During the ratification era several leading federalists seem in
passing to have suggested such a possibility, including President
Edmund Pendleton of the Virginia ratifying convention,13 1 James
Madison in The FederalistNo. 45, and Alexander Hamilton in No. 81.
It seems that similar suggestions were made in early committee
deliberations on the First Judiciary Act.' 3 2 Yet as Ellsworth later
128 Amar, A Neo-Federalist View, supra note 9, at 262 (footnote omitted).
129 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).

Iso See Amar, Section 13, supra note 15, at 463-78.
131 See ELLIOTS'S DEBATES, supra note 62, at 517.
132 See Warren, supra note 23, at 66.
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explained, such state-federal hybrids were unworkable precisely
because of structural disparities in office-holding. If state judges
were "constitut[ed] .. .pro tanto, Federal Judges, .

.

.they would

continue [as] such during good behavior, and on fixed salaries,
which, in many cases, would illy comport with their present tenure of
office." 1 1 3 The flip side of this point is thatfederal-federal hybrids
were thinkable only because such schemes did "comport with [the]
tenure of office" of all federal judges.
This is not to say that circuit riding was constitutionally
unproblematic. As Professor Currie has noted, the hybrid scheme
raised important questions about multiple-officeholding and the
appointments clause.'
Thus, if anything, the First Judiciary Act
may have pushed parity a bit too far.
This point is most evident in the Act's treatment of Supreme
Court jurisdiction. For although the two-tier thesis focuses on the
general parity of all federal courts, it also notes the specific ways in
which the Supreme Court is special. 1 5 It is, for example, the only
Court that, strictly speaking, derives its jurisdiction directly from the
Constitution itself. This jurisdiction is to a very large extent defeasible, for Congress may make exceptions to the Court's appellate jurisdiction, and may even, under a two-tier approach, restrict the
Court's original jurisdiction over state-party cases. 136 Nevertheless,
strictly speaking, Congress does not confer jurisdiction in the
Supreme Court in the same way it confers jurisdiction on lower federal courts. Yet the Judiciary Act does not seem to respect this distinction. It speaks of conferring the Court's appellate jurisdiction,
not making exceptions to it.
The Supreme Court later cured this awkward phrasing in the
celebrated Durousseau' 3 7 case by reading the Act as if it contained an
opening phrase, "Congress hereby excepts all the Supreme Court's
constitutionally-derived appellate jurisdiction but for the following
....

" Harder still to understand is where the first Congress thought
133 Id. William Smith of South Carolina and William Paterson made much the

same point in floor debates on the Judiciary Act. See I ANNALS OF CONG., supra note

62, at 850; Notes of William Paterson, supra note 58, at 478-79; see also J. GOEBEL,
supra note 60, at 471 n.34; 3J. STORY, supra note 9,§ 1749 & n.3; Letter from Senator
Robert Morris to Richard Peters (Aug. 24, 1789), in 9 PETERS PAPERS COLLECTION,

pt. 2,at 99 (Historical Society of Pennsylvania).
134 See Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Powers of the Federal Courts,
1801-1835, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 646, 663-64 (1982).
135 See Amar, A Neo-Federalist View, supra note 9, at 221 n.60, 257 n.168.
136 See id. at 254 n.160; Amar, Section 13, supra note 15, at 478-88.
137 Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307, 314 (1810).
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it had authority to decline to "give" the Supreme Court original
jurisdiction in "all cases affecting ambassadors,"'' 3 8 or at least to substitute its own paraphrase of the language of article III.
These wrinkles remind us again that perfect consistency with the
Judiciary Act cannot be the ultimate touchstone of our theories of
article III, for the Act contains some features that almost everyone
would now recognize as unconstitutional. But if we overlook the
technical wrinkles, and the often awkward phrasing, and focus
instead on the Act's basic structure, we see repeated confirmation of
basic article III principles, such as the true principle of parity.
Given the Act's unequivocal-indeed, overly enthusiasticembrace of parity, it is ironic indeed that so many commentators
today seem to miss this structural truth. It is even more ironic that
some may have been led astray by ordinary language conventions set
in motion by the Act itself-namely, our habit of referring to
Supreme Court officials as "Justices," and lower article III officers as
"Judges." As noted earlier, the Constitution contains no such distinction-it singles out only a "Chief Justice" who is to preside at
presidential impeachment trials.' 9 But the Act of 1789 introduced
an invidious linguistic discrimination when it called other Supreme
Court officials "associate justices" in section 1 while insisting in section 3 that any other article III officer "shall be called a District
Judge." Once again, we must pierce through Ellsworth's clumsy
phrasing to see the structural truth obscured by his word choices.
5.

The Coextensiveness Principle

To the extent the Act satisfies the bifurcation mandate, it also
meets the lesser-included requirements of coextensiveness. The Act
also illustrates that the principle is not a sterile one based only on
138 During the ratification period, Ellsworth himself seemed to acknowledge
that Congress had no authority over these cases. See ESSAYS ON THE CONSTrrunON OF
TrE UNrrED STATES 164 (P. Ford ed. 1892) (reprinting Letter to Landholders and
Farmers from a Landholder (VI), Conn. Courant, Dec. 10, 1787).
139 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. In sharp contrast, on two separate occasions
the Constitution explicitly speaks of Supreme Court "Judges." Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2;
id. art. III, § 1. Before the Judiciary Act, it appears that the dominant oral and
written usage referred to Supreme Court '"judges." See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST
CONCORDANCE 282-87 (T. Engeman, E. Erler & T. Hofeller eds. 1988) ("judge" and
"judges" used over 20 times in FederalistPapers to describe Supreme Court officers as
well as lower federal adjudicators; "justices" never used in this fashion, except for
one reference in No. 65 to "Chief Justice" presiding at Presidential impeachment);
Amar, Section 13, supra note 15, at 471 (quoting George Mason at Philadelphia
Convention discussing 'judges [sic] of the Supreme Court").
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flow-chart symmetry, but rather a principle intimately bound up with
the rule of law-hence the Act's explicit focus on claims of federal
right.
6.

The Principle of Inadequate Political Safeguards

As with its coextensiveness counterpart, the political safeguards
principle is satisfied a fortiori by the Act's conformity with the bifurcation principle. Consistent with the political safeguards principle,
the language of section 25 is obviously concerned with assuring federal jurisdiction to protect constitutional rights against both states
and Congress-concern evidenced by plainly redundant language.
(Given the rather plenary scope of the third clause,
it is unclear what
14 0
the first two clauses add, except confusion.)
The political safeguards principle should also remind us of a
point so basic, it should go without saying. The principle has bite
precisely because Congress cannot be fully trusted as a guardian of
constitutional values. But this point holds true for the first Congress
as well. Indeed, it especially holds true for the first Congress; fully
two-thirds of the first senators were given less than the usual six year
terms to build up national reputations before having to account for
themselves back home, before the state legislatures that had selected
them.14 1 Many state legislators were both personally and professionally jealous of the new federal government-especially its judiciary,
which would enjoy the most insulation from state legislative
influence. 142
We must also remember that the Constitution derived its
authority not from these legislators, but from special conventions of
the People themselves, who ratified the document.' 4 3 Many of the
federalists' strongest and clearest voices at Philadelphia and in the
fights for ratification-those of James Wilson, Gouverneur Morris,
and Alexander Hamilton, to name just a few-were conspicuously
absent from the first Congress.' 4 4 Although several "federalists"
played leading roles in drafting the Act-most obviously Oliver Ellsworth-the leading historian of the Act, Charles Warren, has con140 See, e.g., Ratner, supra note 42, at 185-86; Sager, supra note 18, at 58-59; supra
text accompanying notes 99-112.
141 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 2.
142 See Amar, A Neo-FederalistView, supra note 9, at 222-28, 250.

143 See generally Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE LJ. 1425, 1427,
1429-66 (1987); Amar, supra note 3; see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 402-05 (1819).
144 See Clinton, supra note 56, at 1524-27.
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cluded that the Act "pleased the Anti-Federalists more than the
Federalists."' 1 45 And with all due respect, "federalists" like Ellsworth and his mentor, Roger Sherman, were simply not in the same
league as James Wilson' 46 in the depth and breadth of their structural understanding of the new Constitution.
Thus, even if it were the case that the First Judiciary Act is
"significan[tly]" at odds with the two-tier thesis-and I hope I have
shown that the reverse is true-this would hardly end the matter.
The political safeguards principle is a constant reminder that even
the first Congress may have misunderstood the Constitution. If
there are myriad and strong independent reasons for embracing the
two-tier thesis-and I believe there are-then it provides a sturdy
basis for critique of the Act, rather than vice-versa. As it turns out,
however, the Act is instead a friend of the two-tier thesis, furnishing
yet another reason for accepting Story's analysis, as revised in 1985.
II.

THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FIRST JUDICIARY ACT

A.

The Sounds of Silence

If there is some irony in the fact that "significant gaps" in the
Judiciary Act raise "difficult questions" for Hart & Wechsler, the
casebook's invocation of the Act's legislative history is equally ironic.
"If the distinction between the two tiers was so significant," ask the
editors, "why is there so little evidence of explicit recognition of that
distinction ... in the available history of the 1789 Act?"' 4 7 They
buttress this question with a footnote citing a 1985 essay by Professor Casto as "[o]ne recent study of the history of the 1789 Act [that]
reveals no references to the distinction." 14' Yet Professor Casto's
essay was an attempt to measure the historical evidence against Professor Clinton's unitary argument that all nine categories of article III
49
jurisdiction must be vested, at least on appeal, in federal courts.'
Nowhere did Casto careftilly sift the historical record with an eye
towards explicitly confirming or disconfirming the two-tier thesis.
Given that he was asking the wrong question, we should be wary of
any attempt to read his essay as furnishing reliable evidence regard145 Warren, supra note 23, at 53.
146 Cf. Amar, A Neo-Federalist View, supra note 9, at 230 n.86; Amar, supra note

143, at 1437, 1439 n.57.
147 HART & WECHSLER, supra note 13, at 386.
148 Id. at 386 n.40.
149 See Casto, supra note 63, at 1102-03.

1542

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 138:1499

ing the two-tier thesis. As Alexander Bickel elegantly reminded us,
"[n]o answer is what the wrong question begets."' 0
Casto's essay is nonetheless quite relevant in helping to furnish
the first of several answers to Hart & Wechsler's question, but this
answer is, as noted above, an ironic one indeed. At one point in his
essay, Casto writes:
To reconcile [the limitations enacted by the first Congress]
with a theory of mandatory vesting, one must assume that some of
the heads of jurisdiction in the Constitution are mandatory but
others-most notably diversity and alienage jurisdiction-are not.
Article III does not suggest this hierarchy, nor has any historical
evidence 15been adduced to support such a constitutional
doctrine.

1

The biggest problem with this passage is not that Professor
Casto disagrees with the two-tier thesis, but that he seems unawareof
it. He cites nothing here, not Story's Commentaries, not Martin, not my
1985 essay-nothing. Thus, when Professor Casto wrote his essay, he
was apparently oblivious to the arguments that the text and structure
of article III do suggest a hierarchy, and that there is considerable
historical evidence for such a constitutional doctrine-in the Philadelphia convention records,"5 2 in a string of classic nineteenth century expositions by ChiefJustice Marshall and Justice Story, 153 and
even, as we shall see in more detail below, in the First Judiciary Act.
(Indeed, Casto's own language in this passage seems to concede that
the Act exemplifies bifurcation, although Casto appears unaware of
the significance of this concession.)
Given the timing of his publication, Professor Casto's apparent
lack of awareness of my own 1985 essay is wholly understandable.
Far more puzzling, however, is Casto's seeming unfamiliarity with
central passages of Martin v. Hunter's Lessee." r Martin, of course, is
the classic Marshall Court exposition on jurisdiction stripping,
authored by one of the most important figures in American constitutional history. What's more, in the Clinton essay Casto sought to
critique, Martin was explicitly invoked as the Supreme Court exposition closest to Clinton's own thesis.15 To invert the language of
150 A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 103 (1962).

151 Casto, supra note 63, at 1125.
152 See Amar, A Neo-Federalist J'iew, supra note 9, at 242-45.
153 See supra notes 37-39.
154 This is not the only occasion on which Casto's unfamiliarity with Martin
seriously weakens his analysis. See, e.g., supra note 102.
155

See Clinton, supra note 18, at 750-51 & nn.20-21. Professor Clinton did not
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Hart & Wechsler, "If the distinction between the two tiers is so forceful and powerful (as the casebook itself acknowledges) why is there
so little explicit recognition of that distinction by Professor Casto?"
The closest thing to an answer to this puzzle is the fact that the
two-tiered language of Martin was excluded from pre-1988 editions
of Hart & Wechsler, editions which virtually defined the canon of federal jurisdiction for scholars of Professor Casto's generation. 5 6 Yet
of course this fact only pushes the puzzle back one level: "If the
distinction is even merely plausible (as the third edition concedes)
why was it ignored by the first two editions?"
In asking these blunt questions it is not my aim to embarrass
excellent scholars or stoop to ad hominem. My argument is analytic
not personal, and in fact becomes even stronger when its targets are
acknowledged as scholars of the first rank. The argument is simply
this: if even careful scholars can overlook significant language in
article III and in landmark expositions of that article, then the same
is of course true for members of the first Congress.15 7 In both cases
the brute fact remains that article III's language is two-tiered: "all"
is used selectively. Justice Story and I have provided an account to
explain why this language is two tiered; others-whether scholars or
Congressmen-who have apparently eschewed bifurcation-have
provided none.
Often, they have not reected bifurcation so much as ignored it. To
put the point somewhat tendentiously, the strong affirmative argument against the two-tier thesis boils down to, quite literally, nothing.
It is an (often implicit) argument that the selective language of article
III has no real significance,' based on the asserted absence of explicit
recognition of the distinction, among people who apparently did not
read carefully the words of the framers or the Marshall Court.
explicitly mention or quote the two-tier language of Martin, but that language is
prominent on the face of the pages from Martin he cites, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) at 32739, had Professor Casto taken the time to consult them. Moreover, Clinton's citation
of Martin is accompanied by an extended quotation from William Crosskey which
explicitly mentions "the omission of 'all' in the categories of the judicial enumeration
that are described as 'Controversies.' " Clinton, supra note 18, at 750 n.20 (quoting 1
W. CROSSKEY, PoLrics AND THE CONSTrTUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES

615 (1953)).

156 See Amar, Law Story, supra note 9, at 689-91.
157 At one point during the debate, anti-federalist Aedanus Burke of South
Carolina moved that the Act's reference to a "ChiefJustice" should be struck out as
"a concomitant of royalty." When New York Representative Egbert Benson properly
pointed out that this title derived from the Constitution itself, Burke sheepishly
withdrew his motion. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. supra note 62, at 812.
158 See, e.g., M. REDISH, supra note 10, at 185.
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Nowhere has anyone-Casto, Hart & Wechsler, Redish, Clinton, or
anyone else-pointed to a single eighteenth century figure who
explicitly says that the selective use of the word "all" has no significance and should in effect be disregarded.' 5 9
This last point is important, for it should remind us that there
are not two but three possible categories into which the historical
evidence might conceivably fit. The issue is not simply, as Hart &
Wechsler's question might imply, whether the framers of the 1789 Act
explicitly embraced bifurcation or were merely silent, for there is a
third possibility: the framers of the Act could have made statements
explicitly rejecting the idea that the selective use of the word "all" has
meaning, or offering some other interpretation of its significance. If
only two categories existed, then silence might strongly undermine
the two-tier thesis; but in fact silence does not necessarily cut one
way or the other. Even if it "were the case that the legislative history
of the Act "reveals no references to the distinction"-and we shall
see that it is not-Hart& Wechsler never points to any affirmative evidence challenging my reading of the selective use of the word "all."
What's more, first principles of constitutional law establish that
the burden of historical proof is not upon those who seek to follow
the most plausible meaning of the text, but on those who seek to
avoid that meaning. 6 ' As John Marshall reminded his readers in
Marbuy v. Madison, "It cannot be presumed, that any clause in the
constitution is intended to be without effect; and therefore, such a
construction is inadmissible, unless the words require it."' 16 1 To

similar effect is language from Story's two-tier passage in Martinlanguage which has been edited 6ut of even the third edition of Hart
& Wechsler: "It is hardly to be presumed that the variation in the
language could have been accidental." '6 2 The language of these
cases quite self-consciously allocate legal burdens of proof-both
passages speak of legal "presum[ptionsl." For lawyers who take
technical doctrine seriously--as the editors of Hart & Wechsler generally do-the true "difficult question" should be, "what affirmative
historical evidence exists to overcome the seemingly straightforward
meaning of the words?"
159 Nor does any such source appear in either of the two comments on the
present essay. Apparently, neither Professor Redish nor Professor Meltzer seems
inclined-or able-to accept my challenge to "put up or give up."
160 See 1 J. STORY, supra note 9, §§ 397-407; 3 id. § 1263; cf. Amar, A NeoFederalist View, supra note 9, at 214 n.39, 219 n.57, 230 n.86.
161 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 174 (1803).
162 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 334.
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Indeed, the presumption in favor of the two-tier thesis is even
stronger than this, for the thesis draws strong support from a series
of interconnected structural arguments, outlined above, which
underscore the primacy of federal question and admiralty cases, and
the superiority of federal courts in adjudicating these cases. 163 The
presumption in favor of the most plausible reading is strengthened
even more by the fact that, notwithstanding the intimations of Hart &
Wechsler, 64 this reading is supported by considerable historical evi1 65
dence from the records of the Philadelphia Convention.
The issue of burden of proof is especially important because the
amount of legislative history from the Act of 1789 is by all accounts
rather scanty. As Professor Casto concedes: "Because all debates in
the first Senate were secret, there is some difficulty in piecing
together a complete history of the act." 16' 6 Records of the debates in
the House are somewhat more complete, but most of the structure of
the Act had been fixed by the time the Bill reached the Representatives. 167 In the words of Representative Egbert Benson,
The Senate had employed a great deal of time in perfecting this
bill, and he believed had done it tolerably well; besides, the session
was now drawing'to a dose; he therefore wished as few alterations
as possible to be made in it, lest they should not get it through
68
before the adjournment.1

To be sure, the "formal" legislative history can be supplemented by
other sources, such as letters, but even here there are important
gaps. For example, a letter from that central figure James Wilsonthe man who in the Philadelphia Committee of Detail penned the
two-tier language of article III-to Pennsylvania Senator Robert
Morris on the subject of the pending Judiciary Bill has yet to be
found (if it still exists).' 6 9 The incompleteness of the record counSee supra text accompanying notes 16-36.
The casebook editors question why there is "so little evidence of explicit
recognition" of the bifurcation principle in late eighteenth century commentary
other than the debates over the Act. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 13, at 386.
165 See Amar, A Neo-FederalistView, supra note 9, at 242-45; see also id. at 245-46 &
n.130 (explicit recognition by many key federalists during ratification era that
163
164

diversity cases were less significant). In their comments on the present essay, both
Professors Redish and Meltzer significantly understate the Philadelphia Convention
evidence. For my response, see Amar, Reports of My Death Are Greatly Exaggerated: A

Reply, 138 U.

PA.

166 Casto,

L. Rav. 1651 (1990) [hereinafter Amar, Reply].

supra note 63, at 1107.

See Clinton, supra note 56, at 1533.
1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 62, at 812.
Conversation with Charlene Bickford, Project Director, First Federal
Congress Project, George Washington University. For references to this letter, see
167
168
169
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sels special caution in drawing strong inferences from silence, as
Hart & Wechsler seems to invite. To the extent there is not overwhelming and indisputable affirmative evidence on behalf of the twotier thesis, it may simply be because the record is small and spotty.
In the end, the persuasiveness of the two-tier thesis is like the
old joke about whether old age is a good thing or not: the critical
question is, compared to what? Just as the key historical comparison
is not between explicit endorsement of the two-tier thesis and
silence, so too the relevant bottom-line comparison is not between
the two-tier thesis and perfection. Rather, the comparison is between
the two-tier thesis and other theories of article III-and here, there is
really no comparison. Other theories offer no satisfactory account of
the entire text, no persuasive rebuttals to the myriad structural arguments underlying the two-tier thesis, and no affirmative historical
support. The two-tier thesis may not be perfect, but it sure is better
70

than nothing.1

Diary of William Maclay, supra note 113, at 100, 103-04. At the Pennsylvania
ratifying convention, Wilson took pains to use the precise two-tiered language of
article III-"all cases" in some categories, versus "controversies" in others-even as
he simultaneously paraphrased other language from the article III jurisdictional
menu. See 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 62, at 489-93; see also 4 id. at 156-58
(similar care taken by federalist William Davie in North Carolina ratification
convention).
Professor Casto has argued that Wilson's later decision in Wiscart v. D'Auchy, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 321, 324-27 (1796), is "quite inconsistent with the theory of mandatory
aggregate vesting." Casto, supra note 63, at 1123. Given that Casto himself properly
concedes that the mandatory vesting theory "would not have been pertinent because
a federal-rather than a state-court had made the findings of fact sought to be
reviewed," id., it is a mystery how Casto can only a few sentences later proclaim
Wilson's decision "quite inconsistent" with this theory. Casto apparently reads
Wilson as denying Congress power to make exceptions over Supreme Court
admiralty jurisdiction in favor of lower federal courts. Even if this were Wilson's
argument, it would not be inconsistent with the notion that some federal court must
have the last word on all admiralty cases-it would simply be supplementary to such a
theory, adding a "Supreme Court essential functions" gloss to the aggregate
mandatory vesting theory. In fact, however, Wilson was not making any such
argument. He was simply saying that although Congress might withhold all Supreme
Court appellate jurisdi6tion over lower federal courts in admiralty, see Wiscart, 3 U.S.
(3 Dall.) at 326, if Congress sought to confer such jurisdiction on the high court,
Congress could not simultaneously limit the Court's authority to revisit factual
questions; the nature of admiralty jurisdiction called for appellate review of both law
and fact if appellate review was to be provided at all. Wilson's opinion in Wiscart thus
focused on issues far closer to those raised by United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 128 (1872), than by Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869). For
further support for this reading of Wiscart, the interested reader should consult J.
GOEBEL, supra note 60, at 486; 3J. STORY, supra note 9, § 1757; Clinton, supra note 18,
at 774 n.113, 805 n.206; Warren, supra note 23, at 108, 127 n.1 7 3.
170 Neither of the two comments on the present essay fill-the breach. Indeed,
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Still Small Voices

The preceding remarks have generally assumed, arguendo, the
factual validity of Hart & Wechsler's premise that there is "little
explicit recognition" of the two-tier thesis in the "available history"
of the First Judiciary Act. In fact, if we know what to look for and
search the record with care, we shall find considerable historical support for the thesis.
Just as the strongest indication of the framers' "intent". "is the
constitutionallanguage itself 171 so too with the Act of 1789-and as we
have already seen, the words and general structure of the Act itself
strongly support the two-tier thesis. Hart & Wechsler notwithstanding, the Act itself is "explicit recognition" of the two-tier thesis-a
fact which the editors miss because they make craters out of
moleholes, seeing "significant gaps" that are largely irrelevant or
nonexistent. In fact, the basic consistency between the Act and the
two-tier thesis runs even deeper, for the arguments various legislators made for or against this Act harmonize very well with the principles underlying the thesis. Let us, once again, consider each
principle in turn.
1. Holism
As William Paterson declared in his speech to the Senate: "A
Beauty frequently results from a View of the whole, which is lost
when garbled, or taken by Piecemeal."' 72 Other legislators took up
Paterson's invitation to focus on "the whole"-in particular, on the
federal judicial power as a whole, and on the words of article III as a
whole. Indeed, Paterson himself noted that states' rightists explicitly
focused on federal judicial power in a holistic way: original federal
court jurisdiction could be reduced precisely because "It]here may
be an appeal from the State Courts to the federal."' 73 Or to quote
from Representative James Jackson, "one appeal ...

would answer

every purpose; he meant from the State courts immediately to the
Supreme Court of the continent."'1 74 A little later in the debate,
Jackson once again exemplified holism by pointing out how the contheir affirmative and comparative textual, historical, and structural arguments on behalf
of more "traditional" accounts of article III are consistently thin and conclusory as I
show in my rejoinder. See Amar, Reply, supra note 165.
171 J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 16 (1980); see also supra note 160.
172 Notes of William Paterson, supra note 58, at 478.
173 Id. at 475 (emphasis added).
174 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 62, at 833.
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trast between different clauses of article III enhanced the plain
meaning of each clause:
In the constitution it is declared that the Judicial power of the
United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such
inferior courts as Congress may, from time to time ordain and
establish. From hence he presumed that there was a constitutional
necessity for the establishment of a Supreme Court, but there was a
discretionary power
in Congress to establish, from time to time,
1 75
inferior courts.
Jackson was not alone in his effort to make holistic sense of the
framers' selective use of words like "shall" and "may." Consider, for
example, the following statement by federalist William Smith:
The words, "shall be vested," have great energy, they are words of
command; they leave no discretion to Congress to parcel out the
Judicial powers of the Union to state judicatures, where a discretionary power is left to Congress by the constitution; the word
"may" is employed where a discretion is left; the word "shall" is
176
the appropriate term; this distinction is cautiously observed.
Unfortunately, Smith ait times betrayed his own insight by misquoting the language of the inferior courts clause, and arguing that
such courts were constitutionally required. 17 7 Smith sometimes
appeared to argue that article III ousted state courts from exercising
concurrent jurisdiction; nevertheless, at other times he seemed to
acknowledge that state courts might take original jurisdiction of
cases falling within the mandatory judicial power, subject to a constitutional requirement of appellate review by some federal court: "If
the state courts are to take cognizance of those causes which, by the
constitution, are declared to belong to the judicial courts of the
United States, an appeal must lie in every case to the latter, otherwise the judicial authority of the Union might be altogether
eluded."1 7 1 Smith's emphasis on appellate review as a substitute for
original jurisdiction, and his emphasis on the judicialauthority of the
Union, mesh perfectly with holism's insistence that the judicial
power of the United States is vested "in the federal judiciary, and not
1 79
in state courts, or in Congress."
175
176
177
178
179

Id. at 862.
Id. at 850.
See id. at 828, 850.
Id. at 828-29; see also infra text accompanying note 219.
See supra text accompanying note 11.
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Bifurcation

When Smith referred to "those causes which, by the constitution, are declared to belong to the judicial courts of the United
States" in which appeal to some federal court "must lie" whenever
state courts took original jurisdiction, which "causes" did he have in
mind? Let us carefully consider Smith's own words on the matter:
It is declared by [the Constitution] that the judicial power of the
United States shall be vested in one supreme, and in such inferior
courts as Congress shall [sic] from time to time establish. Here is
no discretion, then, in Congress to vest the judicial power of the
United States in any other tribunal than in the Supreme Court and
the inferior courts of the United States. It is further declared that
the judicial power of the United States shall extend to all cases of a
particular description. How is that power to be administered?
Undoubtedly by the tribunals of the United States; if the judicial
power extends to those specified cases, it follows indisputably that the
tribunals of the United States must likewise extend to them....
[Congress cannot] assign the jurisdiction of these very cases to the
State courts, to judges who, in many instances, hold their places for
a limited period; whereas the constitution, for the greater security
of the citizen, and to insure the independence of the federal
judges, has expressly declared that they shall hold their commissions during good behavior. To judges who are exposed every
year to a diminution of salary by the State Legislatures; whereas,
the constitution, to remove from the federal judges all dependence
protected them from any dimion the Legislative or Executive,18has
0
nution of their compensation.
This passage is remarkable in many respects. We should, for example, note Smith's holistic integration of the "shall be vested" and
tenure and salary clauses of article III into the jurisdiction-stripping
analysis-a marked contrast indeed to the divide-and-conquer methNor should we
odology all too common among today's scholars.'
ignore Smith's strong affirmation of the structural superiority of federal over state judges, and of the structural parity of all "federal
judges," supreme and inferior. For our purposes now however, the
most important feature of this passage is its strong endorsement of
bifurcation. Smith speaks of the judicial power extending to "all
180 1 ANNALS

OF CONG.,

supra note 62, at 831-32 (emphasis added).

181 See, eg., Redish, supra note 18. Smith's comments are thus flatly inconsistent
with Professor Redish's claim that, as a constitutional matter, article III salary and
tenure provisions are not relevant to the question whether a given case should be
heard by a federal rather than state court. See id. at 150.
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cases" in certain categories, and then makes two additional references to these "cases." This is, of course, the language of the
mandatory tier only, for article III denominates permissive tier lawsuits as "controversies" not "cases," and the word "all" is nowhere
to be found.
Professor Clinton has read Smith's statement as referring to all
nine categories of cases and controversies, and thus supportive of
Clinton's own unitary mandatory thesis.1 82 This is surely a plausible
reading, but the bifurcation reading is preferable for two reasons.
First, as we have already seen, Smith sought to parse the language of
article III with some care, and stressed the significance of the selective and contrasting use of words like "shall" and "may." 183 In the
absence of strong evidence to the contrary, we should not lightly
assume that Smith intended to abandon these interpretive principles
when confronting the selective and contrasting formulations "all
cases" and "controversies"; here too, the "distinction" in article III
language "is cautiously observed." 184 Indeed, this distinction is
"cautiously observed" in Smith's own wording, for he quotes only
the "all cases" language, and places much stress on this language.
Second, we must remember that Smith in the end voted for the First
Judiciary Act notwithstanding the fact that the Act came nowhere
close to vesting federal courts with final jurisdiction over all diversity
suits. If read as referring to all nine categories, Smith's language
would be hard to square with this vote; if read more cautiously and
narrowly, the puzzle disappears.
Additional light on Smith's remarks comes from Abraham Nott
who, like Smith, was a federalist from South Carolina, and who
entered the House of Representatives within eighteen months of
Smith's departure in 1797.185 During the debate on the so-called
Midnight Judges Act of 1801, Nott used language and arguments
remarkably similar to Smith's. After citing the opening "shall be
vested" clause of article III, Nott declared:
The obvious meaning of the Constitution, was that the judicial
power of the United States should be confined to courts established and organized by their own government. Besides... it was
required that the Judges should hold their offices during good
behavior, but this was not the case in the several states....
182 See Clinton, supra note 56, at 1534-36.
183 See supra text accompanying note 176.
184 Id.

185 See BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS, 1774-1989,
at 60-64 (G.P.O. 1989).
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The doctrine to be contended for would be further obvious by
a reference to the second section of [article III] expressing the
cases to which the Judicial Power of the United States should

extend. 186
Thus far, this is vintage Smith. But Nott was even more explicit than
his predecessor about which article III cases he had centrally in
mind:
There was a marked difference between the words of the Constitution relating to the catalogue of cases enumerated in the first part
of [the article III menu] and those in the latter part of the same.
The word "all" was prefixed to each of the cases first mentioned,
down to the words "admiralty and maritime jurisdiction" inclusive,
but was omitted in all the subsequent cases. He [i.e., Nott] could
see no reason why that word was added in the former part of the
section, and omitted in the latter part, except it meant there was no
case of the former description to which the Judicial power of the
United States should not extend; in fact that the courts of the
United States should have exclusive jurisdiction of all those cases,
and in the latter
their jurisdiction should be concurrent with the
187
state courts.
To be sure, these are Nott's words, not Smith's, but they are
obviously important in their own right, especially given when and
where they were uttered-one of the most important and most comprehensive discussions of the relationship between Congress and the
federal courts ever to occur in the halls of Congress. What's more,
Nott's 1801 words can also help us interpret Smith's 1789 speeches.
The deep parallels between their arguments-the invocation of the
"shall be vested" and "shall extend" language, the interjection of
salary and tenure provisions in the analysis, the careful attention to
specific article III words, and even the too-quick collapsing the
notion of exclusive (original) federal jurisdiction and the analytically
distinct idea of leaving federal courts with the last word via appealsuggest that Nott may well have learned his lessons in federal juris88
diction from Smith.'

6 ANNALS OF CONG. 893 (1801).
Id. at 894.
188 Smith's biographer chronicles one episode in 1793 where Smith appears
quite self-consciously to have shaped young Nott's political views: "I found a smart
young country lawyer ... desirous of understanding [the treasury debates] .... I left
him with a duplicate of the speeches, which I had carried with me & a pamphlet;
186
187

before I left him, he was quite one of us." G.

ROGERS,

EvoLurION

OF A FEDERALIST:

(1758-1812) 245 (1962) (quoting Smith
and identifying young man as "without doubt Abraham Nott").
WILLIAM LOUGirrON SMrrH OF CHARLESTON
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Smith's 1789 remarks in the House were parallelled by those of
William Maclay in the Senate. In response to a motion by anti-federalist Richard Henry Lee "that The Jurisdiction of the [lower] Federal
Courts should be confined, to cases of admiralty and MaritimeJurisdiction,"' 189 Maclay rose up:
The Effect of the Motion was to exclude the Federal Jurisdiction,
from each of the States, except in admiralty and maritime Cases.
But the Constitution expressly extended it to all cases in law and
equity under the Constitution the Laws of the united States, Treaties made or to be made. &ca. [W]e already had existing Treaties
and were about making many laws. These must be executed by the
federal Judiciary. [T]he Arguments which had been used would
under Considapply well, if amendments to the Constitution19were
0
eration. but certainly were inapplicable here.
Professor Clinton has invoked this language on behalf of his unitary
mandatory thesis,' and once again, this is not a wholly implausible
reading. But once again, the narrower bifurcation reading provides
a better account of the exact words of the passage. Here too, the
phrase used is "all cases," not "controversies." Maclay went on to
make it clear that he was talking about allfederal question cases, not
about all nine categories of"cases and controversies. The exclusive
focus on federal questions meshes perfectly with the two-tier thesis,
for the Lee motion which Maclay rose to oppose conceded the need
for plenary federal admiralty jurisdiction-and as we have already
seen, admiralty is the only other mandatory tier category arguably
subject to curtailment by Congress through joint deployment of its
"exceptions" and "ordain and establish" powers in divide-and-conquer fashion. Maclay's failure to mention diversity jurisdiction is
hard to explain under Professor Clinton's reading, but easily understandable when examined through the bifurcation lens.
Maclay's insistence on the primacy of federal question jurisdiction is, if anything, even more evident in his remarks the next day:
I rose and read over from the Constitution a number of the powers
of Congress-Viz. collecting Taxes duties imposts, naturalization
of Foreigners. Laws respecting the Coinage, punishing. the counterfeiting of the Coin. Treason against the united States &ca.
declared that no force of Construction. could bring these Cases
within Admiralty or maritime Jurisdiction-and Yet all these Cases,
189 Diary of William Maclay, supra note 113, at 85 (paraphrasing Lee's motion).
For the apparent actual wording of the motion, see Warren, supra note 23, at 67.
190 Diary of William Maclay, supra note 113, at 85 (emphasis added).
191 See Clinton, supra note 56, at 1530-31.
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were most expressly the Province of the Federal Judiciary. so that
the question expressly turned upon this point, shall we follow the
Constitution or not . . . . the Constitution placed the Judicial
power of the Union in One Supreme Court and such inferior
Courts as should [sic] be appointed. &of Course the State Judges
in Virtue of their Oaths, would abstain from every Judicial Act
under the federal laws. and would refer all such Business to the
federal Courts ....
[H]ere it was totally different [from England]. the Mass of
Causes would remain with the StateJudges, those only19arising
from
2
Judges.
federal
the
before
come
would
laws,
federal
If Professor Clinton tends to read the words of Maclay and

Smith too expansively,'

Professor Casto returns the compliment by

virtually ignoring them. He devotes only a single footnote to these

passages, which he cites but does not quote. His major argument for
ignoring them is that both men "espoused the notion that concurrent state court jurisdiction of causes within Article III is unconstitutional. . .
This is the argument that Hamilton destroyed in
Federalist No. 82 and that was rejected in numerous ratification conventions." '9 4 As we have seen, however, Smith at times seemed to
acknowledge that state courts would exercise concurrent jurisdic-

tion, and insisted only that "appeal must lie in every case" of a "particular description" to "the judicial courts of the United States."'

95

In any event, even if Smith and Maclay did hold erroneous views
about concurrent state court jurisdiction, their arguments about the
mandatory character of the "shall be vested" and "shall extend to all

cases" language, and Smith's emphasis on federal judges' salary and
tenure guarantees, are analytically severable from the concurrent
Diary of William Maclay, supra note 113, at 86-87 (emphasis added).
These are not the only examples of Professor Clinton's tendency to move a
bit too quickly from historical evidence about the need for federal question
jurisdiction in federal courts to more sweeping conclusions about all nine categories.
See, e.g., Clinton, supra note 18, at 816 (invoking statement by Archibald Maclaine in
North Carolina ratifying convention about federal question jurisdiction as
encompassing "cases of federal magnitude" and then making sweeping claims about
"each and every case within" the article III menu); id. at 844 (moving from evidence
about the need for federal courts "to assure conformity with the Constitution and
federal law" to conclusion about "all cases involving federal law questions ormatters of
transstate concern" (emphasis added)); cf. id. at 817 (paraphrasing Madison in Virginia
ratifying convention as saying that diversity cases "might safely have been left to state
courts" by the Philadelphia convention, when Madison in fact said that diversity cases
"might be left to state courts" by future Congresses-in direct contradiction to
Clinton's theory (emphasis added)).
194 Casto, supra note 63, at 1110 n.70.
195 See supra text accompanying notes 177-78; infra text accompanying note 219.
192
193
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jurisdiction issue. If there are strong historical, structural, and textual reasons for rejecting Smith and Maclay's arguments about the
unconstitutionality of state court concurrent jurisdiction-and both
Casto and I agree that there are such reasons 196-there are not
equally valid reasons for ignoring the residue of Smith's and
Maclay's remarks. (Similarly, we need not agree with everything Story
said in Martin-such as his claim that some lower federal courts were
constitutionally required-in order to treat with due respect other
things that Story said, namely, his basic two-tier argument quoted at
the outset of this essay.)
Casto also claims that the Judiciary Act, as finally approved,
"gave the back of its hand to the Smith-Maclay analysis." ' '
But
once their arguments about concurrent jurisdiction are severed, the
Act harmonizes perfectly because their analysis strongly supports the
bifurcation principle underlying both article III and the Act itself.
In another footnote, Casto again betrays his tendency to slight
important evidence undercutting his own theories. The Notes of
Senator William Paterson include the following sentence: "The
Constn. points out a Number of Articles, which the federal Courts
must take up."1 98 Casto argues that "the cases that 'the federal
courts must take up' may be the few cases within the Supreme
Court's mandatory original jurisdiction"' 9 9 but this wishful interpretation does violence to the plain words of the passage, which speak
of federal courts holistically, and not the Supreme Court. What's
more, this interpretation runs aground on the same shoals that we
have seen earlier, 20 0 for Casto offers no reason why the "shall" language is "mandatory" in the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction
clause, but not elsewhere in article III. Casto also argues that "the
verb, 'must take up,' may be hortatory."201 This reading is surely
possible; but then again, i.t is virtually always possible to ignore
inconvenient evidence by refusing to read words in their most natural way. Yet again, the bifurcation reading is more satisfactory, as it
accounts for more evidence ("shall," "all," and now "must") than
competing theories. Finally, Casto argues that the phrase "a
Number of Articles," may "refer[] to substantive provisions of the
Constitution rather than the list of cases and controversies in Article
A Neo-Federalist View, supra note 9, at 212-14, 233-34, 255 n.165.
197 Casto, supra note 63, at 1110 n.70.
198 Notes of William Paterson, supra note 58, at 477.
199 Casto, supra note 63, at 1108 n.56.
200 See supra text accompanying notes 78-80.
201 Casto, supra note 63, at 1108 n.56.
196 See Amar,
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III, section 2. ' ' 202 Although Casto seems to present this as an
independent argument, it cannot stand on its own and ultimately collapses into his "hortatory" reading of "must." If "must" means
"must," then even under Casto's "substantive provisions" reading,
Paterson is arguing that federal courts must hear federal question
cases, a proposition Casto is at pains to deny.
When closely examined, Paterson's notes provide modest additional support for the bifurcation principle. Paterson does not say
that Congress is free to give state courts the last word in any case it
fancies (the unitary permissive thesis); nor does he say that federal
courts must hear all nine categories of cases and controversies (the
unitary mandatory thesis). Rather, consistent with the bifurcation
thesis, Paterson notes that some ("a number of") articles must be
heard by federal courts.
But which ones? Paterson's notes are much more cryptic here,
but Professor Casto's "substantive provisions" reading suggests that
Paterson may have been thinking about cases arisiiig under the Constitution, and perhaps federal laws. If so, Paterson's notes fit beautifully with the requirements of bifurcation, even as they ironically
undermine Casto's own (later) claim that no historical evidence has
been adduced to support the idea that "some of the heads of jurisdiction in the Constitution are mandatory but others-most notably
diversity and alienage jurisdiction-are not."' 20 3 Elsewhere, Paterson strongly affirmed the coextensiveness principle, once again suggesting his
commitment to mandatory federal
question
jurisdiction.20 4 Additional, albeit subtle, evidence comes from
another portion of Paterson's notes: "Hence we shall approximate
to each other gradually-Hence we shall be assimilated in Manner, in

Laws, in Customs-Local Prejudice will be removed.

... 205

This

prediction implies that the need for diversity jurisdiction was only
temporary, and provides additional confirmation of the structural
bifurcation argument I made in 1985:
To guard against particular-and foreseeable-instances of special
bias in state tribunals, the framers wanted to allow impartial
national courts to hear [diversity] ... cases, if necessary. But the
necessity would not be uniform and unwavering-it would vary
from state to state and year to year. Instead of laying down an
absolute rule of mandatory national jurisdiction in all such cases,
202
203
204
205

Id.
Id. at 1125.
See infra text accompanying notes 236-37.
Notes of William Paterson, supra note 58, at 477.
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the Framers were content to commit the issue to a congressional
discretion that could accommodate fluctuating circumstances
206

Taken together, the statements of Smith, Maclay, and Paterson furnish more support for the two-tier theory than for any competing
interpretation of article 11]. 2 07 Yet perhaps the strongest evidence
on behalf of the theory comes not from these federalists, but from
the anti-federalist side of the aisle. Let us now consider carefully
both what these men said, and what they did not say.
Despite their hostility to other categories of lower federal court
original jurisdiction, especially diversity, leading anti-federalists
affirmatively endorsed the concept of lower federal court original
jurisdiction over all admirallty cases. Senator Lee's motion, it will be
recalled, sought to eliminate all other categories of original jurisdiction in the inferior federal courts, but expressly approved the (constitutionally nonobligatory) creation of these courts for admiralty
cases. Indeed, it appears that support for at least this much original
jurisdiction was virtually unanimous in the Senate. Much the same
thing can be said of the House. Representatives Thomas Tudor
Tucker, and Samuel Livermore echoed their ally Lee both in their
opposition to other categories of original jurisdiction and in their
explicit endorsement of federal district courts of admiralty. 20 8 In a
letter written in early September, 1789, Massachusetts Representative Fisher Ames wrote that federal admiralty courts "were not
denied to be necessary" by states' rightists. 0 9
206 Amar, A Neo-Federalist View, supra note 9, at 245-46; see also Amar, Section 13,
supra note 15, at 478 (framers anticipated that increased interstate commerce would
reduce state parochialism and conesponding need for diversity jurisdiction). In the
end, the framers expected the parochicial nature of state courts to vary over time, but
not their political nature. Future state courts might become less hostile towards outof-staters, and thus, might prove trustworthy in deciding purely state law
controversies; but those courts would never have article III insulation from temporary
majorities, see Amar, A Neo-FederalistView, supra note 9, at 226 n.8 1. Thus, they would
never be sufficiently trustworthy guardians of certain countermajoritarian

constitutional rights, or sufficiently independent of politics to satisfy the rule of law
concerns (implicit in the coextensiveness principle) whenfederal law was at issue. Put
another way, state courts might become fair arbitrators or umpires of local disputes,
but never independent expounders and guardians of national norms. Cf id. at 246

n.133.
207 See supra text accompanying notes 169-70.
208 See 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 62, at 813; id. at 791-92 (Tucker's
proposed constitutional amendment eliminating diversity jurisdiction but explicitly
calling for lower federal courts of admiralty).
209 1 WORKS OF FISHER AMEs 69 (S. Ames ed. 1854) (reprinting Letter from
Fisher Ames to George Minot (Sept. 3, 1789)).
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When we turn from admiralty to the other major mandatory tier
category, arising underjurisdiction, a similar pattern emerges. Here,
the states' rightists wanted only appellate rather than original federal
court jurisdiction, but once again, they generally agreed on the need
to give the last word in all these cases to a federal court. As with
lower federal court admiralty jurisdiction, what is most striking about
section 25 is the relative lack of controversy it engendered, despite its
sweeping scope.2 10 Although the section allowed any losing party
with a federal claim to drag the winning party hundreds of miles
away to the distant Supreme Court, even in cases where the financial
stakes were trivial, the section as written was supported by many legislators who fought tooth and nail against otherjurisdictional categories such as diversity. Perhaps the most eloquent and emphatic of
these was Representative James Jackson:
But we are told, he said, it is necessary that every Government
should have the power of executing its own laws. This argument
would likewise fail ....

[Not only are state courts bound by the

supremacy clause but] does there not remain the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to control them, and bring them to their
reason? Can they not reverse or
confirm the State decrees, as they
2 11
may find them right or wrong?

Professor Clinton has read Jackson's remarks as supporting a
unitary mandatory thesis, 11 2 but this reading ignores critical features ofJackson's position. Jackson was talking only of federal question jurisdiction, not diversity. He begins this passage by invoking
the coextensiveness principle-a notion which, as we have already
seen, is intimately bound up with "arising under" jurisdiction-and
ends by paraphrasing the "reverse[] or affirm[]" language of section
25, a section which, again, only deals with arising under jurisdiction.
Jackson was arguing only for federal question appellate jurisdiction
over state courts, and not, as Clinton seems to imply, for comparable
appellate review over state courts in pure state-law diversity cases.
210 Some support did exist in the first Congress to amend the Constitution to
allow appeals to the Supreme Court only in cases involving a thousand dollars or
more. See supra note 62. For our purposes, two features of this effort are noteworthy.
First, the amendment failed, and was opposed by both federalists and anti-federalists
on grounds strongly supportive of the two-tier thesis. See id. Second, the fact that the
proposal took the form of a constitutional amendment may suggest that even its
supporters may have understood that a mere statute would have been vulnerable on
article III grounds, at least in the absence of lower federal court review of state court
decisions.
211 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 62, at 834.
212 See Clinton, supra note 56, at 1536-37.
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Despite gaping holes in lower federal court original jurisdiction in
diversity, holes that Jackson sought to widen much further, neither
he nor anyone else made a serious or sustained argument for federal
appellate jurisdiction over state courts in diversity suits barred from
inferior federal courts. And of course, the Act as finally approved
embodies this overwhelming consensus.
If Jackson's remarks are somewhat embarrassing to Professor
Clinton's thesis, they are even more so to those who seek to make
hay out of the alleged "significant gaps" in section 25. For Jackson
at least, section 25 was plenary, and covered all arising under casesthere "will not, neither can there be" 21 3 federal question suits
outside section 25. And nowhere else does the legislative history disclose that section 25 was seen, by either federalists or antis, as con2 14
taining significant gaps.
In the end, the dominant anti-federalist position was well
summed up by Samuel Livermore:
Now, if we have a Supreme Court, to which appeals can be carried
[under Section 25], and an Admiralty [federal district] Court for
deciding cases of a maritime nature, our system will be useful and
complete .... Ifjustice cannot be had [in state courts] there will
be an appeal [under section 25]2 15
to the federal Supreme Court,
which is all that can be required.
Taken as a whole, the weight of the evidence supports bifurcation. Legislators in both Houses expressly placed weight on the
"shall be vested" and "shall extend to all cases" phrases of article
III, phrases which lie at the base of the two-tier thesis. But as noted
earlier, while the selective text of article III provides the most obvious and tangible evidence for bifurcation, the deepest and most sat1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 62, at 846.
But see Letter from William Smith to John Rutledge (Aug. 9, 1789), in files of
First Federal Congress Project, George Washington University (file # 07409)
(suggesting that Rutledge saw gap in language of § 25).
215 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 62, at 827-28; see also 9 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 1789-1791, supra note 58, at 456
(reprinting Notes of Pierce Butler). Butler argued:
Perhaps some Gentlemen will tell me that my objections extend to
destroy all Centricaling power in the General Judiciary-I answer No-I
would give them Appellate Jurisdiction in all Cases, And Original in
Admiralty or Maritime Cases And in whatever related to the Collection of
the Revenue of the General Government.
Id. (emphasis added). For views similar to those of Livermore, Jackson, and Butler
expressed during the ratification era, see, for example, the remarks of anti-federalist
213
214

Samuel Spencer in the North Carolina ratifying convention, in 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES,

supra note 62, at 155.
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isfying reasons for embracing the bifurcation reading are structural:
federal question and admiralty jurisdiction is structurally and qualitatively more important than, say, diversity jurisdiction. It is this
structural point that the Act's legislative history overwhelmingly confirms. Time and again, legislators of all political stripes affirmed the
primacy of these two categories ofjurisdiction. Whether these legislators explicitly invoked-or were even aware of-the selective language of article III is somewhat besides the point. Once again, the
brute fact remains that the language is two-tiered; and the basic sentiments and intuitions evidenced in the first Congress give us additional reasons for choosing to treat this two-tiered language as
significant, and for respecting the language's most plausible and
coherent reading.
3 & 4.

Structural Superiority and True Parity

We have already noted one speech in which William Smith
stressed the unique structural independence enjoyed by all federal
judges but lacking in state courts.2 1 6 This was a theme Smith
(ex)pounded on over and over:
[A federal judge] will be more independent than the State judges,
holding his commission during good behavior
and not influenced
2 17
by the fear of a diminution of his salary.
There is another argument that appears conclusive; the constitution provides that the Judges of the Supreme and inferior courts,
shall hold their commissions during good behavior, and shall
receive salaries not capable of diminution .... 218
...

For Smith, the flipside of the structural superiority of federal judges
was the notion of parity within the federal bench. Lower federal
courts, unlike state courts, could be trusted with the last word in vital
areas such as admiralty:
By restricting the State courts to few causes of federal jurisdiction,
the number of appeals will be diminished, because every cause
tried in those courts will, for the reasons before mentioned, be subject to appeal; whereas the jurisdiction of the district court will be
final in many cases. Inasmuch, therefore, as those appeals are
grievous to the citizens, which lie from a court within their own
State to the Supreme Court at the seat of Government, and at a
216 See supra text accompanying note 180.
217 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 62, at
218 Id. at 850.

829.
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great distance, they
will consequently be benefited by an exemp2 19
tion from them.
William Paterson's notes are much to the same effect, describing in
detail the structural disparities of selection, tenure, and salary
between state and federal judges,2 20 and arguing for vesting the last
word in various cases in lower federal courts for reasons of geographic convenience: "How as to Appeals-Bring Law Home-meet
every Citizen in his own State-not drag him 800 miles upon an
22
appeal... Sup. Court cannot go into each State." '
The idea that one of the biggest differences between Supreme
Court and lower federal court judges is geographic, not structural, is
a notion at the very center of the two-tier thesis.2 2 And it is an idea
219
220
221
222

Id. at 829-30.
See Notes of William Paterson, supra note 58, at 476, 478-79.

Id. at 475.

See, Amar, Section 13, supra note 15, at 471-78.
Professor Meltzer takes issue with my geographic argument in a variety of ways,
only a few of which can be briefly addressed here. Because Meltzer's rendition of my
argument is at times a bit too quick and at others a bit too grudging, the interested
reader would do well to consult my original formulation. To summarize my biggest
objections:
(1) Although Meltzer suggests that much of my geographic evidence concerns
matters "quite different" from Supreme Court original jurisdiction, see Meltzer, supra
note 80, at 1605, some of my sources explicitly connected geography and Supreme
Court original jurisdiction, see, e.g., Amar at 471-72 (Madison in Philadelphia); id. at
475 (Samuel Chase's subtle invocation of geography). There is less geographic
evidence about original jurisdiction simply because, as Meltzer himself notes, there is
less overall discussion of original jurisdiction. Given that geographic concerns
ramified throughout the Constitution, see id. at 469-71, and indeed pervaded virtually
every other aspect of article III (as Meltzer himself seems to concede, Meltzer, supra
note 80, at 1605) his manipulation of the burden of proof by labelling all these other
issues "quite different" (a classic divide and conquer approach) shows more lawyerly
skill than historical sensitivity. To serious historians of the period, it is rather
obvious that geography was an overwhelming fact of daily life and an overarching
concern of both federalists and antis in the late 1780s. I never meant to claim that
geography was the only factor influencing Supreme Court original jurisdiction, but
simply that it was an important one that many legal scholars had overlooked. Cf.
Amar, A Neo-FederalistView, supra note 9, at 254 (discussing special dignity of Supreme
Court in ambassador cases).
(2) I do not believe that in each and every suit that article III allows to be tried in
the Supreme Court, eighteenth century geography always made that venue most
convenient; but in general, geographic considerations in ambassador and state party
cases tended to favor-or at least not greatly disfavor, as was true for other article III
categories-trials in the national capital. It's easy to conjure up certain fact patterns
where the generalizations fail; ard Meltzer does usefully identify some of these
scenarios. See Meltzer, supra note 80, at 1605-08. Yet even here, the issue is far more
mixed than Meltzer acknowledges. For example, cases affecting consuls were far less
momentous than cases affecting ambassadors who generally did reside in the nation's
capital-a sign of their geographic, as well as politicalcentrality. Cf U.S. CoNsT. art. II,
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that appears over and over again in the Judiciary Act's legislative his§ 3 (President "shall receive Ambassadors and other public ministers," but not
consuls). The Judiciary Act reflects this intertwined centrality by providing for
exclusive Supreme Court original jurisdiction over suits against ambassadors, but
only concurrent jurisdiction in suits against consuls. SeeJudiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20,
§§ 9, 13, 1 Stat. 73. A "geographic" reading of article III can provide a rather nice
explanation for this fact. What's more, regardless of foreign consuls' residence, the
President and State Department would be headquartered in the national capital.
Given the desirability of quick communication between Executive and Judiciary in
many of these delicate cases, concurrent venue in the nation's capital makes far more
geographic sense than Meltzer admits. Cf. I REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
OF 1787, at 111 (M. Farrand ed. 1937) (remarks of George Mason that only Supreme
Court judges "fixed near seat of government" could communicate with the President
as part of proposed Council of Revision).
(3) Meltzer seems to doubt whether the framers expected that federal legislators
in the nation's capital would litigate in the Supreme Court. See Meltzer, supra note
80, at 1604 n.126. There is abundant evidence. Daniel Webster, for example,
litigated more cases before the Court (170) than any other counsel in history except
Walter Jones. See Commemoration of the 200th Anniversary of the Supreme Court's First
Sitting, 110 S. Ct. cx, cxiv (1990) (remarks of Rex Lee); see also Finley, Daniel Webster
Packed 'Em In, YEARBOOK 1979, SUPREME COURT HiSTORICAL SocIETY 70, 71. (Jones
of course litigated Martin and anticipated Story's two-tier analysis. See supra text
accompanying note 48.) Yet another casual datum: in literally every one of the early
nineteenth century cases that both Meltzer and I cite, at least one federal legislator
argued before the Court. See Commonwealth Bank v. Griffith, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 56
(1840) (John J. Crittenden); Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657
(1838) (Webster); American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S.- (1 Pet.) 511 (1828)
(Webster); Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824) (Henry
Clay and Webster); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821) (William
Pinkney and Philip Barbour); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)
(Webster andJoseph Hopkinson); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304
(1816) (Henry St. George Tucker); see also 1 C. WARREN, supra note 48, at 50
(discussing large number of Congressmen sworn in during 1790 to practice before
Supreme Court). Finally, even federal legislators who did not themselves litigate
were in an excellent position to hire and monitor Washington lawyers who wouldhence my language about federal legislators attending to states' litigation interests, see
Amar, Section 13, supra note 15, at 476. Despite Meltzer's doubts, it strains credulity
to believe that none of these developments were anticipated by the framers who,
after all, expected federal legislators to represent their state's interests in the nation's
capital-especially given that under the Articles of Confederation the only suit
between states ever to reach judgment before the nascent national tribunal
established to hear such cases was in fact litigated by a member of Congress. See, e.g.,
J. GOEBEL, supra note 60, at 189 (role of Connecticut Congressman Jessee Root in
1782 hearings of Pennsylvania v. Connecticut dispute over Wyoming Valley). Members
of Congress also appeared before the national tribunal in both of the only two other
state suits that came before the tribunal, but never reached judgement. See 1 J.
CARSON, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNrrED STATES 75 (1902) (role of New York
Congressmen Egbert Benson, Robert R. Livingston, and Walter Livingston in New
York-Massachusetts dispute); id. at 76 (role of South Carolina Congressmen John
Kean, Charles Pinckney, and John Bull and Georgia Congressmen William Few and
William Houston, in South Carolina-Georgia dispute).
(4) I argue that although state party cases need not be heard in any federal court,
if they are to be so heard, geographic fairness requires that they be triable in a

1562

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 138:1499

tory.2 25 Indeed, Paterson's notes elsewhere acknowledge that even
anti-federalists seemed to concede parity within article III, by
acknowledging the trade-off between original jurisdiction in lower
federal courts and appellate jurisdiction over state courts by the U.S.
Supreme Court.2 24 As Ellsworth later explained, "Circuit courts...
would... settle many cases in the States that would otherwise go to the
Supreme Court.... Without this arrangement, there must be many
appeals or writs of error from the Supreme Courts of the States
"225

The structural superiority of federal justice was especially
important in cases arising under federal law. As James Madison
explained, state courts, in many states
will satisfy us that they cannot be trusted with the execution of the Federal laws .... [In some states] they are so dependent on State Legislatures, that to make the Federal laws dependent on them, would
throw us back into all the embarrassments which characterized our
former situation. In Connecticut the Judges are appointed annually by the Legislature, and the Legislature is itself the last resort in

civil cases.
In Rhode-Island.

.

. the case is at least as bad. 2 2 6

Even anti-federalists at Iimes expressly acknowledged the structural superiority of federal judges. Elbridge Gerry, for example,
geographically neutral forum-the Supreme Court. Amar, Section 13, supra note 15,
at 487 & n.204. My logic here is the logic Meltzer himself admits is plausible:
geographic neutrality is required only "if and when" the federal judiciary intervenes.
See Meltzer, supra note 80, at 1607 n.136. To be sure, I reject the "if and when" logic
as an explanation of the salary and (enure provisions generally, and of the mandatory
language of "shall be vested" and "shall extend to all cases." That is because the "if
and when" logic fails to satisfy all the concerns underlying the rule of law and
coextensiveness principles implicated by federal question jurisdiction. (Put another
way, these principles are implicated "if and when" the Constitution or federal law
intervenes. See supra text accompanying notes 32-34.) But where (by hypothesis)
only state law is at stake, geographic impartiality is required only if and when the
federal judiciary gets involved to umpire the dispute.
See also supra note 206
(distinguishing between political arid parochicial nature of state court adjudication;
concern over geographic parochialism "waivable" by Congress; concern over lack of
political independence, not). Meltzer's apparent willingness here to read various
statements about the importance of state party cases as requiring, rather than simply
allowing, Congress to provide for federal jurisdiction stands in sharp contrast to his
treatment of analogous or stronger statements in the "arising under" context. See,
e.g., infra text accompanying notes .231-40.
223 For examples of the profound importance of geographic considerations in
the FirstJudiciary Act, seeJ. GOEBEL, supra note 60, at 460, 471, 500-01.
224 See Notes of William Paterson, supra note 58, at 479-80.
225 Warren, supra note 23, at 76-77 (geographic emphasis added).
226 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 62, at 844 (emphasis added).
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pointed out that only federal judges were accountable to the nation
through congressional impeachment 2 2 7-a point also noted by Theodore Sedgewick 22 8-and Jackson in one speech noted that "[iut has
been said in this debate, that the state judges would be partial. 2 2 9
Rather than deny the claim, Jackson once again invoked section 25,
(which as we have seen, was limited to federal questions): "the
Supreme Federal Court will have the right to annul these partial
0
adjudications."23
5.

Coextensiveness

The affirmations of coextensiveness in the first Congress are so
clear and so emphatic that no parsing or commentary seems necessary. I shall therefore simply let the legislators speak for themselves.
William Smith:
The Legislative and Executive are now in existence, but the Judicial
is uncreated. While we remain in this state, not a single part of the
several systems can operate; no breach of your laws can be
punished ... The Judiciary is an essential part of the Govern231
ment ....
The Judicial power is a component
part of this Government, and
2 32
must be commensurate to it.
Fisher Ames:
[H]e should think it a wonderful felicity of invention to propose the
expedient of hiring out our judicial power, and employing courts
not amenable to our laws, instead of instituting them ourselves as
the constitution requires. We might with as great propriety negotiate and assign over our legislative as our judicial power; and it
would not be more strange to get the laws made for this body than
after their passage to get them interpreted and executed by those
whom we do not appoint, and cannot control.2 33
A Government that may make but cannot enforce laws, cannot last
long, nor do much good.2 3 4
John Vining:
227
228
229

See id.at 860.
See id. at 836.
Id. at 861.

230

Id.

231

Warren, supra note 23, at 117.

232 1 ANNALS Or CONG.,
233
234

Id at 837-38.
Id at 837.

supra note 62, at 847.
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[The institution of general and independent tribunals were essential to the fair and impartial administration of the laws of the
United States. That the power of maldng laws, of executing them,
and a judicial administration
of such laws, is in its nature insepara23 5
ble and indivisible.
William Paterson:
2 36
[Coextensiveness is in] the very Nature of the Thing.

[T]hey have a Legislature
consisting of two Houses to frame laws for the Weal and Salvation
of the Union-And who are to adjudicate upon these LawsJudges chosen by the Union-No [say some]-A new Era indeed.
Judges chosen by the respective States; in whose Election the
Union has no Voice and over whom they have little23or
no Control.
7
This is a Solecism in Politicks-a Novelty in Govt.
Contemplate the [United States] ....

James Madison:
[The] Judiciary System ... ought to be commensurate with the
other branches of the Government .... [T]he Legislative power is
made effective for its objec:s; the Executive is co-extensive with the
Legislative; and it is
equally proper that this should be the case
2 38
with the Judiciary.
Theodore Sedgwick:
Is it not essential that a Government possess within itself the power
necessary to carry its laws into execution? But the honorable gentleman proposes to leave this business to a foreign authority,
totally independent of this Legislature, whether our ordinances
shall have efficacy
or not. Would this be prudent, even if it were in
23 9
our power?
Although Professor Clinton has cited several of these passages
Id at 853.
Notes of William Paterson, supra note 58, at 476.
Id at 478.
1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 62, at 843.
239 Id. at 836. Leading anti-federalists had embraced the coextensiveness
235
236
237
238

principle during the ratification debates. See, e.g., Letters From the Federal Farmer,supra
note 23, at 230. This embrace of federal question jurisdiction was combined with a
harsh attack on diversity only a few lines later. See id.; see also 2 THE CoMmLE ANTiFEDERALST 428 (J. Storing ed. 1981) (reprinting the Essays of Brutus XII) ("[T]he
judicial power should be commensurate with the legislative.").
James Wilson thought the coextensiveness principle so vital and axiomatic that
his copy of the Philadelphia Committee of Detail's charge contains only two thingsa list of the 19 convention resolutions thus far, in his hand, and a note opposite
resolution 13 on the scope of the national judiciary's jurisdiction: "N.B. the Judicial
should be commensurate to the legislative and Executive Authority." 2 Wilson
Manuscript Collection, item 68, at 6 (Historical Society of Pennsylvania).
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in support of the unitary mandatory theory, 240 all of these comments
are clearly limited to federal question and admiralty jurisdiction, and
thus provide more support for the two-tier thesis.
6. Political Safeguards
It is hardly to be expected that members of the first Congress
would proudly proclaim Congress's general unreliability as a constitutional sentry. Nevertheless, several legislators did ring out variations on the political safeguards principle. Sedgwick, for example,
declared that it was "dangerous ...to make the State Legislatures
the sole guardians of the national faith and honor. '24 1 Left unspoken was the obvious structural corollary: it was also dangerous to
rely solely on entities dependent on state legislators, entities that
included not just state courts, but Congress itself. In a vein similar
to Sedgwick's, Madison wrote to Samuel Johnston:
The Senate have proceeded on the idea that the federal Gov't
ought not to depend on the State Courts any more than on the
State Legislatures, for the attainment of its ends and it must be
confessed, that altho' the reasons do not equally hold in the two
cases, yet not only theoretic propriety, but the vicious constitution
and proceedings of the Courts in the same states, countenance the
precaution in both.2 42
When combined with Madison's earlier structural observations in
The FederalistNos. 45 and 46, about state legislative influence on Congress, and his speech, quoted above, about the dependence of state
courts on state legislatures, 243 this passage once again affirms the
centrality of federal courts-freed from all dependence on state governments-as the primary guardians of federal constitutional rights
against both state governments and Congress.
CONCLUSION:

OF SMOKING GUNS AND BARKING DOGS

When all the historical evidence is collected, sifted, and
weighed, it tends in the aggregate to support the two-tier thesis far
more than to refute it. Virtually every major principle and premise
underlying the two-tier thesis was given voice-sometimes resound240

See Clinton, supra note 56, at 1537-40.

241 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 62, at 836.
242 12 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 53,

James Madison to Samuel Johnston (July 31, 1789)).
243 See supra text accompanying note 226.

at 317 (reprinting Letter from
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ingly, other times more faintly, yet nonetheless distinctly-in the
legislative history of the First Judiciary Act.
To be sure, there is no historical "smoking gun"-no single
piece of historical evidence that clinches the case beyond all doubt.
Indeed, it may even be that only a few legislators integrated the six
principles in exactly the same way that I did in 1985--their task, after
all, was to persuade other politicians, not to expound to scholars.
Thus, the two-tier thesis is best understood as a synthesis, seeking to
combine the strongest and most sensible arguments of each framer
and interpreter of article24I:I into a coherent whole that makes analytic and doctrinal sense. ,J
If we insist on finding a "smoking gun" before accepting the
two-tier thesis, I suggest Are simply look to the text itself, and its
selective language. Careful analysis of various drafts of the Philadelphia Committee of Detail, which originated the two-tiered language,
confirms my reading of the import of the word "all. ' 24 5 But as I
have sought to underscore repeatedly in this essay, the textual argument standing alone is dramatic, but not fully satisfying. Without the
accompanying structural vision explaining why federal courts are
superior to state courts, and why admiralty and arising under cases
are more important than, say, diversity suits, the textual argument is
cute and clever, but arguably not much more. Thus, it is the underlying structural vision that makes the textual argument truly a
"smoking gun" rather than just so much smoke-just as it is always
the presence of other factors-motive, opportunity, other circumstantial evidence, and so on--that makes some final dramatic piece of
evidence the "smoking gun" in a good detective story.
But perhaps the whole search for a "smoking gun" is somewhat
misguided. First, the metaphor may mask the fact that, unlike a criminal case, we should not insist on proof beyond all reasonable doubt.
Rather, we must ask which reading of article III is more plausible,
under a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard-the two-tier
interpretation or some competing theory?
Second, the "smoking gun" metaphor may obscure one of the
most dramatic aspects of the legislative history we have just
examined. From the very beginning, there was a striking consensus
that lower federal courts should have plenary admiralty jurisdiction,
See supra note 17.
245 See Amar, A Neo-Federalist View, supra note 9, at 242-44. To repeat: in their
comments on the present essay, Professor Redish ignores and Professor Meltzer
significantly understates this evidence. For a corrective, see my rejoinder, Amar,
Reply, supra note 165.
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and the Supreme Court plenary appellate federal question jurisdiction over state courts. This "minimalist" anti-federalist alternative
to the Act fully comports with the requirements of article III under
the two-tier thesis. Given that the two-tier thesis was never seriously
threatened, there was little practical need to carefully articulate and
defend it. Perhaps a more apt metaphor from detective stories
derives from the celebrated dog that didn't bark24 6 -- for the minimalist requirements of the two-tier thesis appear to have aroused far
more sounds of contentment than growls of disapprobation from
fierce anti-federalists and other vigilant watchdogs of the rights of
states.
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